Batch-Processing AMM Design Eliminates MEV and Guarantees Arbitrage Resilience
A novel AMM mechanism processes all block transactions in a single batch, mathematically eliminating block producer arbitrage and mitigating MEV extraction.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus in Proof-of-Stake Protocols
Game theory-based revelation mechanisms create a unique, truthful equilibrium for PoS consensus, fundamentally securing block proposal against economic attack.
Game-Theoretic Incentives Guarantee Provably Uniform Decentralized Randomness
A new Randomness Incentive Game (RIG) establishes a Nash Equilibrium where participants are compelled to submit provably uniform inputs, securing all decentralized randomness protocols.
Batch-Processing Mechanism Design Eliminates AMM Arbitrage and MEV Opportunities
This application-layer mechanism achieves arbitrage resilience by batching all transactions, fundamentally removing miner extractable value from AMMs.
Deterministic Fee Mechanisms Cannot Be Collusion-Resistant and Incentive-Compatible
No deterministic transaction fee mechanism can be simultaneously user-incentive compatible, miner-incentive compatible, and collusion-resistant without being trivial.
Cryptographic Auctions and Miner Reserves Achieve Off-Chain Influence Proofness
A new cryptographic auction model with miner-set reserves establishes 'Off-Chain Influence Proofness,' mitigating hidden MEV and redefining transaction fee mechanism design.
RediSwap Mechanism Captures MEV and LVR, Redistributing Value to Users and LPs
This mechanism design breakthrough internalizes arbitrage within AMMs, capturing MEV to provide superior execution and fair value distribution.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Secures Arbitrage-Resilient Decentralized Finance
By shifting MEV mitigation to the AMM's core logic, this mechanism guarantees risk-free profit elimination and truthful user behavior under fair sequencing.
Application-Layer Mechanism Eliminates Arbitrage and MEV in Decentralized Finance
A novel AMM mechanism processes transactions in batches using a constant potential function, guaranteeing arbitrage resilience and user incentive compatibility.
Mechanism Design Guarantees Truthful Consensus in Decentralized Systems
Game theory's revelation mechanisms enforce honest block proposal by establishing a unique, subgame perfect equilibrium in Proof-of-Stake protocols.
Cryptography Circumvents TFM Impossibility for Fair Decentralized Systems
Game theory proves a fundamental impossibility in transaction fee mechanisms, which is solved by cryptographic primitives that enforce fair ordering and privacy.
Active Block Producers Preclude Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
An impossibility proof shows no single TFM can align incentives for both users and active MEV-extracting block producers, mandating external design augmentation.
New AMM Mechanism Achieves Arbitrage Resilience and Strategy Proofness
A new AMM mechanism uses a constant potential function to guarantee arbitrage resilience, shifting MEV mitigation to the application layer.
Impossibility Proof for Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms
Foundational mechanism design proves no deterministic transaction fee auction can simultaneously ensure user truthfulness, miner revenue, and collusion resistance.
Protected Order Flow System Limits Harmful MEV in Builder-Proposer Separation
PROF introduces a mechanism to minimize adversarial MEV in Proposer-Builder Separation, transcending the tradeoff between user protection and transaction inclusion rate.
New Mechanism Design Property Secures Transaction Fee Auctions
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' property challenges EIP-1559's security, proving a cryptographic second-price auction is required for true incentive-compatibility.
Payable Outsourced Decryption Secures Functional Encryption Efficiency and Incentives
Introducing Functional Encryption with Payable Outsourced Decryption (FEPOD), a new primitive that leverages blockchain to enable trustless, incentive-compatible payment for outsourced cryptographic computation, resolving a critical efficiency bottleneck.
Cryptographic Auctions Secure Transaction Fees against Off-Chain Influence
A new cryptographic second-price auction enforces off-chain influence proofness, fundamentally securing transaction fee mechanisms against miner censorship and rent-seeking.
Multi-Party Computation Enables Fairer Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Cryptography, via Multi-Party Computation among block producers, circumvents game-theoretic impossibility results to design non-trivial, incentive-compatible fee mechanisms.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus Equilibrium in Proof-of-Stake
A novel revelation mechanism uses game theory to guarantee truthful block proposals in Proof-of-Stake, simplifying consensus and boosting scalability.
