Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Miner Revenue with Truthful Fees

This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism, overcoming a foundational impossibility theorem to ensure miner incentives and user truthfulness in blockchain networks.
SAKA: A Novel MEV-Resistant Transaction Fee Mechanism

This research introduces the SAKA mechanism, a sybil-proof, incentive-compatible transaction fee design that mitigates MEV's negative impact on blockchain welfare.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Elevates Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation

This research redefines blockchain transaction fee mechanisms, achieving collusion-proofness and positive miner revenue through Bayesian game theory.
Designing Transaction Fee Mechanisms in a Post-MEV Blockchain World

This research unveils the inherent challenges of transaction fee mechanism design in MEV-rich environments, proposing a novel framework to balance incentives.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Miner Revenue and User Incentives

This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism, ensuring miner profitability and user truthfulness by leveraging Bayesian game theory.
Revelation Mechanisms for Trustworthy Blockchain Consensus

This research introduces revelation mechanisms within Proof-of-Stake protocols, fundamentally addressing consensus disputes by incentivizing truthful block proposals.