Protocol-Level MEV Ticketing Internalizes Value for Equitable Blockchain Economic Security
Execution Tickets introduce a native asset to directly broker Maximal Extractable Value, transforming validator incentives and securing protocol revenue.
DAG Architecture Enables Provably Fair, High-Throughput Decentralized Transaction Ordering
FairDAG integrates fairness protocols into multi-proposer DAG consensus, eliminating leader-based MEV while achieving superior throughput.
Mechanism Design Secures Leaderless Protocol Block Producer Incentives
A new extensive-form game model and the FPA-EQ mechanism solve block producer incentive misalignment in leaderless consensus protocols.
Leaderless Mechanism Design Secures Transaction Fee Incentive Compatibility
A new mechanism and game-theoretic property ensure that concurrent block producers in leaderless protocols are incentivized to maximize social welfare.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates AMM MEV for Provably Fair DeFi
A new batch-processing AMM mechanism achieves arbitrage resilience and incentive compatibility, fundamentally shifting MEV mitigation to the smart contract layer.
SAKA Mechanism Solves Incentive-Compatibility for Transaction Fee Design
The SAKA mechanism explicitly integrates MEV searchers into transaction fee design, circumventing impossibility results to ensure full incentive-compatibility.
Multi-Party Computation Circumvents Impossibility in Decentralized Mechanism Design for Fair Fees
Cryptographic Multi-Party Computation enables collusion-resistant transaction fee mechanisms, transforming a game-theoretic impossibility into a secure computation problem.
Mechanism Design Balances Decentralization and Efficiency in Verifiable Computation
New game-theoretic mechanisms characterize the decentralization-efficiency trade-off, enabling provably optimal design for verifiable computation markets.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms: Private Commitment to Verifiably Honest Economic Rules
Cryptographic commitment to a hidden mechanism, verifiable via zero-knowledge proofs, enables trustless private economic systems.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Establishes New Fair Transaction Mechanism Desideratum
A new economic primitive, Off-Chain Influence Proofness, reveals EIP-1559's vulnerability to miner censorship, mandating cryptographic auction adoption.
Game Theory and C-NORM Metric Secure Decentralized Proof-of-Stake Bootstrapping
Foundational game-theoretic analysis introduces C-NORM, a novel centralization metric, proving ideal Proof-of-Stake bootstrapping protocols must satisfy incentive compatibility.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private Rules with Public Verifiability
This framework introduces a new cryptographic primitive that allows mechanism rules to remain secret while using ZKPs to publicly verify incentive compatibility and outcomes, removing the need for a trusted mediator.
Mechanism Design Characterizes Decentralized Verifiable Computation Incentives
This research fundamentally characterizes incentive mechanisms for verifiable computation, balancing decentralization against execution efficiency in strategic environments.
Active Block Producers Create Transaction Fee Mechanism Impossibility
Mechanism design proves that maximal extractable value fundamentally prevents simultaneous incentive compatibility and welfare maximization.
Differential Privacy Enables Provably Fair Transaction Ordering
Establishing a formal link between Differential Privacy and State Machine Replication's equal opportunity property quantifiably eliminates algorithmic bias in ordering.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Achieves Provable MEV Incentive Compatibility
A new AMM mechanism ensures provable incentive compatibility by maintaining a constant potential function, fundamentally eliminating application-layer MEV exploitation.
SAKA Mechanism Circumvents Transaction Fee Impossibility Theorem
Research establishes a mechanism design impossibility for simple fee structures, then introduces the SAKA mechanism to achieve incentive-compatibility and high welfare by formalizing searcher roles.
Impossibility of Off-Chain Influence Proofness in Transaction Fee Mechanisms
A new impossibility theorem proves no transaction fee mechanism can simultaneously satisfy all prior properties and be resistant to off-chain miner influence.
Reasonable-World Assumption Solves Zero Miner Revenue Impossibility Theorem
A new mechanism design incorporates honest user assumptions to achieve asymptotically optimal miner revenue, resolving a core theoretical conflict.
Designing Fair Transaction Fee Mechanisms for Leaderless Blockchains
This research introduces a game-theoretic model and a novel auction mechanism, FPA-EQ, ensuring fair and efficient transaction processing in emerging leaderless blockchain architectures.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms: Private Commitment, Verifiable Execution without Mediators
This research introduces a framework for committing to and executing mechanisms privately, leveraging zero-knowledge proofs to enable verifiable properties without disclosure.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private, Verifiable Commitments without Mediators
This framework leverages zero-knowledge proofs for private mechanism commitment and execution, ensuring verifiable properties without disclosure or mediators.
Private Mechanism Design through Zero-Knowledge Commitments
This research introduces a novel framework for private mechanism design, enabling verifiable commitment to rules without revealing sensitive information or requiring trusted intermediaries.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms: Private Commitment and Verifiable Execution without Mediators
This research introduces a cryptographic framework enabling mechanism designers to commit to and run hidden mechanisms, leveraging zero-knowledge proofs to ensure verifiable properties and outcomes without disclosing proprietary information or relying on trusted intermediaries.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs Enable Private, Verifiable Mechanism Design without Mediators
This research introduces a framework for committing to and executing mechanisms privately, leveraging zero-knowledge proofs to ensure verifiability without revealing sensitive information.
Private Mechanism Design with Zero-Knowledge Proofs Eliminates Trusted Mediators
This research introduces a novel framework for mechanism design, enabling private, verifiable execution of protocols without trusted third parties through advanced zero-knowledge proofs.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms: Private Commitment without Disclosure or Mediators
This research introduces zero-knowledge mechanisms, enabling verifiable, private economic interactions without revealing underlying rules or requiring trusted intermediaries.
Decentralized Mechanism Design Impossibility and Cryptographic Circumvention
This research reveals the fundamental impossibility of fully collusion-resistant blockchain transaction mechanisms, proposing cryptographic techniques to build robust alternatives.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private, Verifiable Economic Commitments without Mediators
This work introduces zero-knowledge proofs to mechanism design, allowing verifiable, private economic interactions without revealing underlying rules or needing trusted intermediaries.