Game Theory and C-NORM Metric Secure Decentralized Proof-of-Stake Bootstrapping
Foundational game-theoretic analysis introduces C-NORM, a novel centralization metric, proving ideal Proof-of-Stake bootstrapping protocols must satisfy incentive compatibility.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private Rules with Public Verifiability
This framework introduces a new cryptographic primitive that allows mechanism rules to remain secret while using ZKPs to publicly verify incentive compatibility and outcomes, removing the need for a trusted mediator.
Mechanism Design Characterizes Decentralized Verifiable Computation Incentives
This research fundamentally characterizes incentive mechanisms for verifiable computation, balancing decentralization against execution efficiency in strategic environments.
Active Block Producers Create Transaction Fee Mechanism Impossibility
Mechanism design proves that maximal extractable value fundamentally prevents simultaneous incentive compatibility and welfare maximization.
Differential Privacy Enables Provably Fair Transaction Ordering
Establishing a formal link between Differential Privacy and State Machine Replication's equal opportunity property quantifiably eliminates algorithmic bias in ordering.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Achieves Provable MEV Incentive Compatibility
A new AMM mechanism ensures provable incentive compatibility by maintaining a constant potential function, fundamentally eliminating application-layer MEV exploitation.
SAKA Mechanism Circumvents Transaction Fee Impossibility Theorem
Research establishes a mechanism design impossibility for simple fee structures, then introduces the SAKA mechanism to achieve incentive-compatibility and high welfare by formalizing searcher roles.
Impossibility of Off-Chain Influence Proofness in Transaction Fee Mechanisms
A new impossibility theorem proves no transaction fee mechanism can simultaneously satisfy all prior properties and be resistant to off-chain miner influence.
Reasonable-World Assumption Solves Zero Miner Revenue Impossibility Theorem
A new mechanism design incorporates honest user assumptions to achieve asymptotically optimal miner revenue, resolving a core theoretical conflict.
