Protected Order Flow Secures Transactions, Aligning Validator Incentives
PROF introduces an incentive-compatible mechanism that enforces private transaction ordering within PBS, mitigating harmful MEV while preserving validator profitability.
Cryptographic Auction Enforces Off-Chain Influence Proofness for Fee Mechanisms
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' criterion exposes EIP-1559's vulnerability, necessitating a cryptographic second-price auction with on-chain miner reserves.
Reasonable-World Assumptions Achieve Optimal Miner Revenue in Fee Mechanism Design
Introducing reasonable-world assumptions circumvents the zero-revenue impossibility result, enabling incentive-compatible transaction fee auctions.
Formal Impossibility Limits Blockchain Fee Mechanism Design, Forcing Trade-Offs
New mechanism design research proves an impossibility for fully incentive-compatible transaction fee protocols, establishing a fundamental trade-off.
Cryptographic Second-Price Auction Achieves Off-Chain Influence-Proof Transaction Fee Mechanism
The Cryptographic Second-Price Auction (C2PA) overcomes TFM impossibility by encrypting user bids, eliminating miner off-chain influence and achieving strategic simplicity.
HotStuff-1: Incentive-Compatible BFT Protocol Achieves Two-Hop Finality
HotStuff-1 achieves optimal BFT latency by introducing fault-tolerant speculative finality, architecturally improving high-throughput decentralized systems.
Strongly BPIC Mechanism Secures Leaderless DAG Consensus Fee Allocation
A new game-theoretic model and First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing (FPA-EQ) mechanism solves transaction fee alignment in leaderless DAG protocols.
Formalizing Blockchain Incentive Compatibility through New Economic Primitives
The research defines MMIC and OCA-proofness, new game-theoretic primitives that formally analyze and secure transaction fee mechanisms against collusion.
Impossibility of Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Non-Manipulable Transaction Mechanisms
New impossibility theorem proves no non-trivial, collusion-resistant, and truth-inducing deterministic transaction mechanism can exist, fundamentally limiting MEV mitigation.
