Oblivious Accumulators Enhance Privacy Hiding Set Elements and Size
This work introduces oblivious accumulators, a cryptographic primitive that conceals set elements and size, enabling truly private on-chain data management.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms: Commitment without Disclosure
A novel framework leverages zero-knowledge proofs to enable verifiable, private execution of economic mechanisms without revealing their underlying rules or requiring trusted intermediaries.
Pseudorandom Error-Correcting Codes Enable Provable AI Watermarking
This research introduces Pseudorandom Error-Correcting Codes (PRCs), a novel cryptographic primitive providing provable guarantees for watermarking generative AI models.
Oblivious Accumulators Conceal Set Elements and Dynamic Changes
This research introduces oblivious accumulators, a novel cryptographic primitive that hides both the elements and the size of a committed set, fundamentally enhancing privacy in decentralized systems.
Oblivious Accumulators Fundamentally Enhance Data Privacy in Decentralized Systems
This research introduces oblivious accumulators, a cryptographic primitive that inherently conceals both elements and set size, enabling truly private decentralized applications.
Vector Commitments Enable Modular Blockchain Scalability and Asynchronous Security
A new Probabilistically Verifiable Vector Commitment scheme secures Data Availability Sampling, decoupling execution from data and enabling massive asynchronous scalability.
Post-Quantum Non-Malleable Commitment from One-Way Functions
A novel cryptographic commitment scheme achieves post-quantum security and constant-round efficiency using only one-way functions, establishing a new foundational primitive for secure computation.
Post-Quantum Polynomial Commitments Enable Scalable, Quantum-Resistant Blockchain Architectures
This lattice-based polynomial commitment scheme achieves post-quantum security and succinct proof size, fundamentally unlocking quantum-resistant ZK-rollups and data availability.
MEV Uncertainty Principles Quantify Transaction Ordering Trade-Offs for Decentralized Fairness
New uncertainty principles establish a fundamental, quantifiable trade-off between validator transaction ordering freedom and user economic payoff complexity.
