Off-Chain Influence Proofness Challenges EIP-1559 and Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
This research introduces off-chain influence proofness, demonstrating EIP-1559's vulnerability to censorship threats and proving fundamental limits on TFM design.
Ethereum Transaction Ordering Exploited via MEV-Boost Sandwich Attack
MEV-Boost manipulation enables transaction sandwiching, allowing attackers to front-run user swaps and extract millions in capital from order flow.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates MEV and Ensures Strategy Proofness
A new AMM mechanism design achieves provable arbitrage resilience and strategy proofness, shifting MEV mitigation from consensus to the application layer.
Decentralized Proposer-Builder Separation Resolves Builder Centralization Risk
This mechanism auctions block-building rights, decentralizing the sequencing process and securing transaction ordering against centralized MEV extraction.
Formal MEV Modeling Mechanically Certifies Optimal Adversarial Strategies
This research pioneers the formal verification of MEV bounds using the Lean theorem prover, providing cryptographic-grade correctness guarantees for DeFi security.
Encrypted Transactions and Randomized Ordering Mitigate Maximal Extractable Value
New MEV-resistant protocol combines transaction encryption with execution randomization, fundamentally removing validator control over profitable ordering.
Encrypted Mempools Integrate Maximal Extractable Value Defense with High-Performance BFT Consensus
By integrating batched threshold encryption into BFT protocols, TrX creates confidential transaction ordering, practically eliminating frontrunning MEV.
Mechanism Design Overcomes Impossibility for Fair Transaction Fee Allocation
A new game-theoretic mechanism, SAKA, circumvents a fundamental impossibility result, achieving incentive-compatibility and 50% welfare for transaction ordering.
Game Theory Formalizes MEV Competition and Mechanism Design Provides Mitigation
The foundational game-theoretic model establishes that MEV extraction is a Bertrand competition, requiring mechanism design solutions like commit-reveal to restore system welfare.
