Quantifying Fairness Granularity Mitigates MEV in Rollup Transaction Ordering
This mechanism introduces fairness granularity to FCFS sequencing, neutralizing network latency advantages and deterring spam for equitable transaction inclusion.
Decoupling Fair Ordering from Consensus Boosts BFT Performance and Security
The new SpeedyFair protocol totally decouples transaction ordering from BFT consensus, achieving higher performance and eliminating MEV-driven front-running.
Game Theory Formalizes MEV Competition and Proposes Cryptographic Mitigation Mechanisms
Formalizing MEV extraction as a three-stage game of incomplete information proves that Bertrand-style competition harms system welfare, necessitating cryptographic transaction ordering.
Threshold Cryptography Secures Transaction Ordering Eliminating Centralized MEV Risk
A threshold decryption protocol forces block ordering before content revelation, fundamentally solving the MEV centralization problem and ensuring transaction fairness.
Decentralized Clock Network Decouples Ordering from Consensus for Fair Transactions
A Decentralized Clock Network assigns provably fair timestamps to transactions, fundamentally eliminating front-running and MEV-driven order manipulation.
Multiple Concurrent Proposers Decouples Block Production to Mitigate MEV Risk
The Multiple Concurrent Proposers protocol uses Verifiable Secret Sharing to enforce selective-censorship resistance, fundamentally decentralizing block sequencing.
Game Theory Reveals Private Orderflow Centralizes Block Building Auctions
Game theory proves private orderflow and latency asymmetries drive MEV-Boost to an oligopoly equilibrium, requiring new trustless orderflow mechanisms.
Decoupled Time-Lock Commitments Enforce Fair Transaction Ordering
Introducing Decoupled Time-Lock Commitments, a new primitive that uses VDFs to cryptographically enforce a future transaction reveal, fundamentally eliminating proposer-side MEV.
SAKA Mechanism Solves Incentive-Compatibility for Active Block Producers
Introducing the SAKA mechanism, this work circumvents TFM impossibility results by integrating MEV searchers to align incentives and guarantee approximate welfare.
