Active Block Producers Undermine Transaction Fee Mechanism Incentive Compatibility
This research reveals active block producers fundamentally complicate transaction fee mechanism design, necessitating augmented protocols for robust incentive alignment.
Formalizing MEV: A New Model for Provably Secure Blockchains
This research formalizes Maximal Extractable Value, providing a mathematical framework to analyze and mitigate economic attacks in decentralized systems.
Formalizing MEV Theory to Secure Decentralized Blockchain Architectures
This research establishes a rigorous, abstract model for Maximal Extractable Value, enabling formal security proofs against its detrimental impact on blockchain integrity.
Formalizing MEV Advances Blockchain Security through a Rigorous Theoretical Model
Establishes a formal MEV theory, enabling rigorous security proofs against economic attacks and paving the way for resilient decentralized systems.
Formalizing Maximal Extractable Value for Provably Secure Blockchains
This research introduces a rigorous, abstract model for Maximal Extractable Value, enabling formal security proofs against its detrimental impact on blockchain integrity.
Formal MEV Theory Enables Provable Security against Blockchain Economic Attacks
A formal theory of MEV, built on an abstract blockchain model, provides a rigorous framework for provable security against economic attacks.
MEV as Dominant Blockchain Scaling Limit Unveiled
New MEV auction design with programmable privacy and explicit bidding unlocks blockchain scaling by curbing wasteful transaction spam.
Quantifying MEV-Share Privacy with Aggregate Hints
Introduces Differentially-Private aggregate hints, enabling users to formally quantify privacy loss in MEV-Share for equitable extraction.
Formalizing MEV Theory for Provable Blockchain Security
A new formal theory for Maximal Extractable Value offers a robust framework to understand and secure blockchain systems against economic attacks.
