Set Byzantine Consensus Decouples Rollup Sequencing from Centralized Control
The research introduces Set Byzantine Consensus to construct a Decentralized Arranger, fundamentally solving rollup centralization by separating transaction content agreement from final ordering.
Verifiable Shuffle Function Ensures Fair Transaction Ordering and MEV Neutrality
A Verifiable Shuffle Function cryptographically enforces random transaction ordering, fundamentally neutralizing MEV and securing decentralized sequencing.
FairFlow: Randomized Ordering and Auction Mechanisms Mitigate MEV
The FairFlow Protocol integrates randomized transaction ordering and auction mechanisms to reduce MEV extraction by 60%, fortifying on-chain fairness.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus in Proof-of-Stake Networks
Mechanism design introduces revelation games to Proof-of-Stake, ensuring a unique truthful equilibrium that fundamentally mitigates coordination failures and dishonest forks.
Impossibility of Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Non-Manipulable Transaction Mechanisms
New impossibility theorem proves no non-trivial, collusion-resistant, and truth-inducing deterministic transaction mechanism can exist, fundamentally limiting MEV mitigation.
Layered MEV Mitigation Ensures Transaction Fairness via Decentralized Auction Ordering
FairFlow introduces a layered protocol using decentralized auctions and randomized ordering to mitigate MEV, ensuring equitable and private transaction execution.
Verifiable Functions Forge Decentralized Consensus Eliminating Predictability and Centralization
PoVF introduces a novel consensus mechanism combining two verifiable functions to guarantee provably fair leader election and eliminate centralization risk.
Secure Timestamp Primitive Rethinks Consensus Fairness in Asynchronous Networks
Researchers introduce a novel, corruption-resistant timestamp primitive, enabling consensus protocols to reliably record transaction submission time, which fundamentally mitigates censorship and MEV risk.
Decentralized Verifiable Computation Mechanisms Limit Efficiency and Participation
Mechanism design for verifiable computation is constrained by a theoretical limit on decentralization, forcing a strategic trade-off between speed and participation.
Batch-Processing AMM Design Eliminates MEV and Guarantees Arbitrage Resilience
A novel AMM mechanism processes all block transactions in a single batch, mathematically eliminating block producer arbitrage and mitigating MEV extraction.
Smart Contract Mechanism Design Ensures Efficient, Fair, and Resilient Decentralized Resource Allocation
A game-theoretic framework for smart contracts proves unique, stable equilibrium, transforming resource allocation from ad-hoc to provably efficient and fair.
Formalizing Shared Security Risk via Adaptive Slashing Mechanisms
Adaptive Slashing Bonds formally quantify systemic risk in shared security protocols, enabling provably secure restaking architectures.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus in Proof-of-Stake Protocols
Game theory-based revelation mechanisms create a unique, truthful equilibrium for PoS consensus, fundamentally securing block proposal against economic attack.
Batch-Processing Mechanism Design Eliminates AMM Arbitrage and MEV Opportunities
This application-layer mechanism achieves arbitrage resilience by batching all transactions, fundamentally removing miner extractable value from AMMs.
Deterministic Fee Mechanisms Cannot Be Collusion-Resistant and Incentive-Compatible
No deterministic transaction fee mechanism can be simultaneously user-incentive compatible, miner-incentive compatible, and collusion-resistant without being trivial.
Cryptographic Auctions and Miner Reserves Achieve Off-Chain Influence Proofness
A new cryptographic auction model with miner-set reserves establishes 'Off-Chain Influence Proofness,' mitigating hidden MEV and redefining transaction fee mechanism design.
Revelation Mechanisms Guarantee Truthful Consensus in Proof-of-Stake Systems
A game-theoretic revelation mechanism uses staked tokens to enforce truthful block proposals, achieving a unique equilibrium and enhancing BFT liveness.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Achieves Strategy Proofness for Automated Market Makers
Researchers devised a new AMM mechanism that uses a constant potential function to eliminate MEV, achieving provable strategy proofness at the application layer.
