Differential Privacy Ensures Fair Transaction Ordering in State Machine Replication
Foundational research links Differential Privacy to equal opportunity in transaction ordering, providing a mathematically rigorous framework to eliminate algorithmic bias and mitigate MEV.
Mechanism Design Balances Decentralization and Efficiency in Verifiable Computation
New game-theoretic mechanisms characterize the decentralization-efficiency trade-off, enabling provably optimal design for verifiable computation markets.
Zero-Knowledge Proof of Training Secures Private Federated Learning Consensus
ZKPoT consensus validates machine learning contributions privately using zk-SNARKs, balancing efficiency, security, and data privacy for decentralized AI.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms: Private Commitment to Verifiably Honest Economic Rules
Cryptographic commitment to a hidden mechanism, verifiable via zero-knowledge proofs, enables trustless private economic systems.
Transaction Encryption and Ordering Randomization Mitigate Extractable Value
A new mechanism design model integrates transaction encryption and execution randomization to eliminate block producer control, ensuring provably fair transaction ordering and system integrity.
Zero-Knowledge Proof of Training Secures Private Decentralized Federated Learning
ZKPoT consensus verifiably proves model contribution quality via zk-SNARKs, fundamentally securing private, scalable decentralized AI.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Establishes New Fair Transaction Mechanism Desideratum
A new economic primitive, Off-Chain Influence Proofness, reveals EIP-1559's vulnerability to miner censorship, mandating cryptographic auction adoption.
Decentralized Proving Markets Secure Verifiable Computation Outsourcing Efficiency
This paper introduces a mechanism design framework for a decentralized proving market, transforming zero-knowledge proof generation into a competitive, economically efficient service.
Game Theory and C-NORM Metric Secure Decentralized Proof-of-Stake Bootstrapping
Foundational game-theoretic analysis introduces C-NORM, a novel centralization metric, proving ideal Proof-of-Stake bootstrapping protocols must satisfy incentive compatibility.
