Zero-Knowledge Proofs Enable Verifiable, Hidden Economic Mechanisms without Trusted Mediators
Cryptographic commitments hide mechanism rules while zero-knowledge proofs verify incentive compatibility, unlocking private, trustless economic design.
Mechanism Design Secures Consensus by Eliminating Dishonest Forking Incentives
A Simultaneous Report mechanism replaces costly network-wide voting, achieving provably truthful consensus by making dishonest block proposals economically irrational.
Mechanism Design Secures Leaderless Protocol Block Producer Incentives
A new extensive-form game model and the FPA-EQ mechanism solve block producer incentive misalignment in leaderless consensus protocols.
Leaderless Mechanism Design Secures Transaction Fee Incentive Compatibility
A new mechanism and game-theoretic property ensure that concurrent block producers in leaderless protocols are incentivized to maximize social welfare.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates AMM MEV for Provably Fair DeFi
A new batch-processing AMM mechanism achieves arbitrage resilience and incentive compatibility, fundamentally shifting MEV mitigation to the smart contract layer.
SAKA Mechanism Solves Incentive-Compatibility for Transaction Fee Design
The SAKA mechanism explicitly integrates MEV searchers into transaction fee design, circumventing impossibility results to ensure full incentive-compatibility.
Collaborative VDFs Enable Multi-Party Time-Lock and Fair Decentralized Protocols
Collaborative Verifiable Delay Functions introduce a new primitive for joint, publicly verifiable time-delay, securing fair multi-party mechanism design.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus Equilibrium
Mechanism design introduces dispute-triggered revelation protocols into PoS, ensuring validators propose truthful blocks as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, fundamentally enhancing security and scalability.
Commitment-Decay Mechanism Secures Decentralized Private Transaction Ordering Fairness
A Commitment-Decay Mechanism uses economic bonds and parameter commitments to provably secure fair transaction ordering in decentralized private pools.
