Non-Linear Stake Weighting Enhances Proof-of-Stake Decentralization and Security
New non-linear stake weighting models diminish the marginal utility of large pools, structurally incentivizing stake distribution for robust decentralization.
New AMM Mechanism Achieves Arbitrage Resilience and Strategy Proofness
A new AMM mechanism uses a constant potential function to guarantee arbitrage resilience, shifting MEV mitigation to the application layer.
Impossibility Proof for Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms
Foundational mechanism design proves no deterministic transaction fee auction can simultaneously ensure user truthfulness, miner revenue, and collusion resistance.
Decoupling Fair Ordering from Consensus Unlocks High-Performance BFT
SpeedyFair decouples transaction ordering from consensus, using parallel processing to achieve a $1.5times-2.45times$ throughput increase over state-of-the-art fair ordering protocols.
Decentralized Clock Network Enforces Fair Transaction Ordering Using Timestamps
This work introduces a Decentralized Clock Network that separates transaction ordering from consensus, using timestamp agreement to enforce $delta$-Median Fairness and mitigate front-running.
Protected Order Flow System Limits Harmful MEV in Builder-Proposer Separation
PROF introduces a mechanism to minimize adversarial MEV in Proposer-Builder Separation, transcending the tradeoff between user protection and transaction inclusion rate.
Zero-Knowledge Proof of Training Secures Private Decentralized Machine Learning Consensus
Zero-Knowledge Proof of Training (ZKPoT) leverages zk-SNARKs to validate collaborative model performance privately, enabling scalable, secure decentralized AI.
New Mechanism Design Property Secures Transaction Fee Auctions
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' property challenges EIP-1559's security, proving a cryptographic second-price auction is required for true incentive-compatibility.
Multi-Party Computation Enables Fairer Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Cryptography, via Multi-Party Computation among block producers, circumvents game-theoretic impossibility results to design non-trivial, incentive-compatible fee mechanisms.
