Application-Layer Mechanism Design Achieves Strategy Proofness for Automated Market Makers
Researchers devised a new AMM mechanism that uses a constant potential function to eliminate MEV, achieving provable strategy proofness at the application layer.
RediSwap Mechanism Captures MEV and LVR, Redistributing Value to Users and LPs
This mechanism design breakthrough internalizes arbitrage within AMMs, capturing MEV to provide superior execution and fair value distribution.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Secures Arbitrage-Resilient Decentralized Finance
By shifting MEV mitigation to the AMM's core logic, this mechanism guarantees risk-free profit elimination and truthful user behavior under fair sequencing.
Application-Layer Mechanism Eliminates Arbitrage and MEV in Decentralized Finance
A novel AMM mechanism processes transactions in batches using a constant potential function, guaranteeing arbitrage resilience and user incentive compatibility.
Mechanism Design Guarantees Truthful Consensus in Decentralized Systems
Game theory's revelation mechanisms enforce honest block proposal by establishing a unique, subgame perfect equilibrium in Proof-of-Stake protocols.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Guarantees Strategy Proofness for AMMs
By shifting MEV mitigation from consensus to smart contract design, a new mechanism guarantees strategy proofness and arbitrage resilience for automated market makers.
Cryptography Circumvents TFM Impossibility for Fair Decentralized Systems
Game theory proves a fundamental impossibility in transaction fee mechanisms, which is solved by cryptographic primitives that enforce fair ordering and privacy.
Cryptographic Fairness: Verifiable Shuffle Mechanism for MEV-Resistant Execution
A Verifiable Shuffle Mechanism cryptographically enforces transaction fairness, eliminating front-running by decoupling ordering from block production.
Active Block Producers Preclude Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
An impossibility proof shows no single TFM can align incentives for both users and active MEV-extracting block producers, mandating external design augmentation.
