Secure Timestamp Primitive Rethinks Consensus Fairness in Asynchronous Networks
Researchers introduce a novel, corruption-resistant timestamp primitive, enabling consensus protocols to reliably record transaction submission time, which fundamentally mitigates censorship and MEV risk.
Decentralized Verifiable Computation Mechanisms Limit Efficiency and Participation
Mechanism design for verifiable computation is constrained by a theoretical limit on decentralization, forcing a strategic trade-off between speed and participation.
Batch-Processing AMM Design Eliminates MEV and Guarantees Arbitrage Resilience
A novel AMM mechanism processes all block transactions in a single batch, mathematically eliminating block producer arbitrage and mitigating MEV extraction.
Smart Contract Mechanism Design Ensures Efficient, Fair, and Resilient Decentralized Resource Allocation
A game-theoretic framework for smart contracts proves unique, stable equilibrium, transforming resource allocation from ad-hoc to provably efficient and fair.
Formalizing Shared Security Risk via Adaptive Slashing Mechanisms
Adaptive Slashing Bonds formally quantify systemic risk in shared security protocols, enabling provably secure restaking architectures.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus in Proof-of-Stake Protocols
Game theory-based revelation mechanisms create a unique, truthful equilibrium for PoS consensus, fundamentally securing block proposal against economic attack.
Batch-Processing Mechanism Design Eliminates AMM Arbitrage and MEV Opportunities
This application-layer mechanism achieves arbitrage resilience by batching all transactions, fundamentally removing miner extractable value from AMMs.
Deterministic Fee Mechanisms Cannot Be Collusion-Resistant and Incentive-Compatible
No deterministic transaction fee mechanism can be simultaneously user-incentive compatible, miner-incentive compatible, and collusion-resistant without being trivial.
Cryptographic Auctions and Miner Reserves Achieve Off-Chain Influence Proofness
A new cryptographic auction model with miner-set reserves establishes 'Off-Chain Influence Proofness,' mitigating hidden MEV and redefining transaction fee mechanism design.
