ZK-Rollup Fee Mechanism Design Space and Cost Optimization
Researchers formalize the ZK-Rollup transaction fee mechanism design space, optimizing operational costs across sequencing, data availability, and proving for long-term incentive compatibility.
Mechanism Design Optimizes Proof-of-Stake Exit Queues Securing Dynamic Validator Sets
Introducing the MINSLACK mechanism, this work formally resolves the PoS utility-security trade-off by dynamically constraining validator exits to maintain crypto-economic safety.
Decentralized Order Flow Auction Secures Transaction Ordering Neutrality
A new mechanism design decentralizes block construction, using cryptographic commitments to enforce fair, censorship-resistant transaction ordering.
Mechanism Design Achieves Strategy-Proof AMMs Eliminating MEV at the Application Layer
A new batch-processing AMM mechanism uses a constant potential function to ensure arbitrage resilience and strategy-proofness, fundamentally mitigating MEV.
Six Trust Primitives Formalize Security for the Autonomous Agentic Web
A new framework classifies inter-agent trust into six primitives—from cryptographic proof to economic stake—enabling secure, scalable AI agent protocols.
Active Block Producer Model Fundamentally Limits Transaction Fee Mechanism Welfare
The SAKA mechanism is a novel game-theoretic solution that achieves incentive compatibility across users and block producers while guaranteeing half of the maximum social welfare.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus in Proof-of-Stake
A game-theoretic revelation mechanism, triggered by block disputes, establishes a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, eliminating dishonest forks and enhancing PoS security.
Mechanism Design Replaces BFT Voting for Faster Consensus
A novel Simultaneous Report Mechanism is proposed to replace costly BFT voting, limiting consensus communication to two nodes for faster, dispute-triggered coordination and improved network liveness.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Achieves Strategy-Proof Automated Market Makers
A new AMM design uses a constant potential function to batch transactions, proving arbitrage resilience and strategy proofness against MEV.
