Formalizing Maximal Extractable Value Theory for Security Proofs
A new abstract model of blockchain execution formally defines Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), shifting the field from empirical observation to rigorous security proofs.
Formalizing Restaking Security Reveals Fundamental Sybil Attack Impossibility
Restaking's Sybil vulnerability is formalized, proving no single slashing rule can universally deter all attack types, necessitating mechanism design trade-offs.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Proof-of-Stake Consensus
Mechanism design introduces a game-theoretic revelation principle to Proof-of-Stake, creating a subgame perfect equilibrium where nodes are uniquely incentivized to propose only truthful blocks, enhancing security and liveness.
Batch Processing AMM Achieves Arbitrage Resilience and Strategy Proofness
This new batch-clearing AMM mechanism formally eliminates miner extractable value by settling all trades at a single price, ensuring strategy-proof execution.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus in Proof-of-Stake Systems
Game theory's revelation mechanisms enforce truthful block proposals in PoS, resolving disputes and fundamentally enhancing decentralized coordination.
Active Block Producers Create Impossibility for Incentive-Compatible Fee Mechanisms
Formal analysis proves active block producers, driven by private MEV, fundamentally prevent simultaneous incentive-compatibility and welfare-maximization.
New AMM Mechanism Design Achieves Arbitrage Resilience and Incentive Compatibility
A novel AMM mechanism uses a constant potential function to batch-process transactions, provably eliminating miner arbitrage and enforcing honest user behavior.
Fair Consensus Factory Mitigates MEV through Order Neutrality
Research introduces the Fair Consensus Factory, a systemic framework to integrate order-fairness primitives into Byzantine consensus, directly addressing the foundational MEV problem.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs Secure Mechanism Design without Revealing Rules
A new cryptographic framework enables verifiable, private mechanism design by using zero-knowledge proofs to commit to rules without public disclosure, eliminating trusted mediators.
