Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Commit to Secret Rules without Trust
Research introduces a ZK-based cryptographic primitive enabling mechanism designers to commit to hidden rules while guaranteeing verifiability and incentive alignment.
Mechanism Design Enforces Truthful Consensus Equilibrium in Proof-of-Stake
A game-theoretic revelation mechanism creates a unique, subgame perfect equilibrium for validating nodes to propose truthful blocks, structurally mitigating dishonest forking risks.
Zero-Knowledge Commitment Enables Private Verifiable Mechanism Design
Cryptography now allows a mechanism designer to prove a system's fairness and incentive compatibility without revealing its private economic rules, securing hidden yet verifiable contracts.
MEV Uncertainty Principles Quantify Transaction Ordering Trade-Offs and Limits
New MEV uncertainty principles quantify the fundamental trade-off between transaction reordering freedom and user economic payoff complexity, proving no universal mitigation exists.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Challenges EIP-1559 and Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
This research introduces off-chain influence proofness, demonstrating EIP-1559's vulnerability to censorship threats and proving fundamental limits on TFM design.
Differential Privacy Ensures Transaction Ordering Fairness in Blockchains
Researchers connect Differential Privacy to State Machine Replication, using cryptographic noise to eliminate algorithmic bias and mitigate Maximal Extractable Value.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates MEV and Ensures Strategy Proofness
A new AMM mechanism design achieves provable arbitrage resilience and strategy proofness, shifting MEV mitigation from consensus to the application layer.
Non-Delegatable Commitments Enforce Cryptographic Proof of Work and Identity
Non-Delegatable Commitments cryptographically bind action to private key possession, preventing outsourcing and enforcing honest participation in attestations.
Threshold Cryptography Introduces Undetectable Collusion Risks in MEV Mitigation
Analyzing threshold encrypted mempools reveals that cryptographic privacy shifts MEV risk to new, undetectable forms of decryptor collusion and information asymmetry
