Formal MEV Theory Enables Provably Secure Blockchain Architectures
A rigorous MEV theory reframes blockchain economic attacks, enabling provably secure protocols and fostering equitable decentralized systems.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private, Verifiable Mechanism Design
This research introduces a framework for privately committing to and executing economic mechanisms, leveraging zero-knowledge proofs to ensure verifiability without revealing sensitive rules or data, fostering trustless interactions.
Formalizing MEV: Mitigating Economic Attacks in Blockchain Systems
This research establishes a rigorous, game-theoretic framework for Maximal Extractable Value, enabling systematic analysis and robust defenses against economic exploits in decentralized systems.
New Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchains Optimizes Transaction Fees
This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism for leaderless blockchains, ensuring block producer incentives and enhancing network efficiency.
Formal MEV Theory Enables Provable Security against Blockchain Economic Attacks
A formal theory of MEV, built on an abstract blockchain model, provides a rigorous framework for provable security against economic attacks.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Miner Revenue and User Truthfulness
This research leverages Bayesian game theory to design blockchain transaction fee mechanisms, overcoming prior limitations to enable non-zero miner revenue while maintaining user truthfulness.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms: Commitment without Disclosure
A novel framework leverages zero-knowledge proofs to enable verifiable, private execution of economic mechanisms without revealing their underlying rules or requiring trusted intermediaries.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private, Verifiable Mechanism Design without Mediators
This research introduces a cryptographic framework allowing economic mechanisms to operate with verifiable integrity while preserving designer privacy, eliminating trusted intermediaries.
Economic Mechanism Design Redefines Blockchain Scalability beyond Technical Throughput
A novel MEV auction mechanism with programmable privacy and explicit bidding unlocks true blockchain scalability, fostering equitable transaction environments.
