Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private, Verifiable Economic Commitments
This research introduces a framework for committing to and executing economic mechanisms without revealing their details, ensuring verifiable properties via zero-knowledge proofs.
Formalizing MEV for Provably Secure Blockchain Architectures
A new abstract model for Maximal Extractable Value provides a rigorous framework for security proofs, fundamentally securing decentralized systems.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Blockchain Fees and Miner Revenue
This research pioneers a Bayesian approach to blockchain transaction fees, overcoming prior incentive limitations and ensuring sustainable miner compensation.
MEV Spam Limits Blockchain Scaling, New Auction Mechanism Mitigates
Redefining blockchain scalability, this research identifies MEV spam as the core economic bottleneck, proposing programmable privacy and explicit bidding for mitigation.
Formalizing MEV Theory for Provably Secure Blockchain Architectures
This research establishes a foundational mathematical framework for Maximal Extractable Value, enabling rigorous analysis and provably secure defenses against economic exploitation.
Leaderless Blockchain Transaction Fees: New Mechanism for Multi-Proposer Protocols
A novel game-theoretic model and FPA-EQ mechanism enable efficient, incentive-compatible transaction fee allocation in leaderless blockchains, crucial for scalable architectures.
Mechanism Design Ensures Truthful Blockchain Consensus, Enhancing Security and Scalability
This research leverages game-theoretic mechanism design to incentivize truthful block proposals in Proof-of-Stake, fundamentally securing consensus and enabling scalable, fork-resistant blockchains.
Formalizing MEV: Rigorous Model for Provably Secure Blockchain Architectures
This research introduces a formal, abstract model for Maximal Extractable Value, enabling systematic analysis and the development of provably secure blockchain protocols.
Active Block Producers Undermine Transaction Fee Mechanism Incentive Compatibility
This research reveals active block producers fundamentally complicate transaction fee mechanism design, necessitating augmented protocols for robust incentive alignment.
