Private Mechanism Design with Zero-Knowledge Proofs Eliminates Trusted Mediators
This research introduces a novel framework for mechanism design, enabling private, verifiable execution of protocols without trusted third parties through advanced zero-knowledge proofs.
Mechanism Design Mitigates Selfish Miner Inefficiencies in Blockchain Order Books
A novel adjustable block size mechanism quantifies and reduces social welfare loss from selfish miner behavior in blockchain order books, enhancing market efficiency.
Incentivizing Multiple Proposers for Robust Blockchain Censorship Resistance
This research designs transaction fee mechanisms to economically incentivize multiple block proposers, fundamentally countering censorship and bribery in decentralized networks.
Blind Vote and Private Auctions: Enhancing On-Chain Protocol Efficiency
This research introduces novel blockchain protocols for untraceable voting and private auctions, leveraging cryptographic tools to achieve superior gas efficiency and robust privacy.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private, Verifiable Economic Commitments without Mediators
This work introduces zero-knowledge proofs to mechanism design, allowing verifiable, private economic interactions without revealing underlying rules or needing trusted intermediaries.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs Enable Verifiable Mechanisms without Disclosure or Mediators
This framework uses zero-knowledge proofs to execute verifiable, private mechanisms, enabling trustless economic interactions without revealing sensitive design.
Blockchain Consensus Complexity Necessitates Adaptive, Trade-Off-Aware Protocol Design
This analysis dissects blockchain consensus, revealing inherent trade-offs in security, scalability, and decentralization, driving innovation in adaptive protocol design.
Formalizing MEV Theory for Scalable Blockchain Security and Mechanism Design
A novel MEV auction mechanism integrates programmable privacy and explicit bidding, redefining blockchain scalability by mitigating economic spam.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Blockchain Fees
This research designs a truthful, collusion-proof transaction fee mechanism, ensuring miner revenue and network stability through a novel Bayesian approach.
