Time-Averaged Commitment Smooths MEV Auctions, Decentralizing Transaction Ordering
Introducing the Smooth-Running Auction, a mechanism using Time-Averaged Commitments to decouple block value from proposer revenue, stabilizing MEV and promoting decentralization.
Mechanism Design Establishes Truthful Equilibrium in Blockchain Consensus
Applying game theory's revelation mechanisms directly to consensus disputes creates a unique, subgame perfect equilibrium that structurally compels truthful block validation.
Zero-Knowledge Proof of Training Secures Federated Consensus
The Zero-Knowledge Proof of Training consensus mechanism uses zk-SNARKs to prove model performance without revealing private data, solving the privacy-utility conflict in decentralized computation.
Smallest Collusions Define Transaction Fee Mechanism Vulnerability
This research reveals that if a blockchain's transaction fee mechanism can be exploited by a two-party collusion, it is inherently vulnerable to any larger collusive group, simplifying security analysis.
Blockchain Digital Courts Enforce Agreements, Surpassing Traditional Legal Systems
This research introduces a novel "digital court" smart contract, leveraging behavioral incentives to enable self-enforcing agreements on blockchains, circumventing traditional legal enforcement.
Designing Fair Transaction Fee Mechanisms for Leaderless Blockchains
This research introduces a game-theoretic model and a novel auction mechanism, FPA-EQ, ensuring fair and efficient transaction processing in emerging leaderless blockchain architectures.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private, Verifiable Commitments without Mediators
This framework leverages zero-knowledge proofs for private mechanism commitment and execution, ensuring verifiable properties without disclosure or mediators.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs Enable Private, Verifiable Mechanism Commitment without Mediators
Zero-knowledge proofs enable verifiable commitment to hidden mechanisms, preserving proprietary information and eliminating trusted intermediaries from economic interactions.
Hidden Mechanisms with Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Private Verifiable Commitment
This research enables verifiable, private mechanism execution without mediators, leveraging zero-knowledge proofs to conceal rules while ensuring compliance.
