Zero-Knowledge Proof of Training Secures Decentralized AI Consensus
A new Zero-Knowledge Proof of Training (ZKPoT) consensus mechanism leverages zk-SNARKs to cryptographically verify model performance, eliminating Proof-of-Stake centralization and preserving data privacy in decentralized machine learning.
SAKA Mechanism Circumvents Transaction Fee Impossibility Theorem
Research establishes a mechanism design impossibility for simple fee structures, then introduces the SAKA mechanism to achieve incentive-compatibility and high welfare by formalizing searcher roles.
Compositional Formal Verification Secures Complex DAG Consensus Protocols
This framework modularizes DAG consensus proofs into reusable components, dramatically reducing verification effort and ensuring robust protocol safety.
Mechanism Design Enforces Truthful Consensus Using Staked Collateral
A novel revelation mechanism leverages staked assets to ensure validators' truthfulness, resolving consensus disputes by making block proposal honesty the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
Zero-Knowledge Proof of Training Secures Federated Learning Consensus
ZKPoT uses zk-SNARKs to verify model contributions privately, eliminating the trade-off between decentralized AI privacy and consensus efficiency.
Mechanism Design Enforces Truthful Consensus, Mitigating Disputes in Proof-of-Stake
Applying economic revelation mechanisms to PoS protocols ensures truthful block proposal as the unique equilibrium, fundamentally enhancing network robustness.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates MEV Guaranteeing Provable Strategy Proofness
Research shifts MEV mitigation from consensus to smart contracts, using batch processing and a potential function to ensure arbitrage resilience and fairer DeFi markets.
Impossibility of Off-Chain Influence Proofness in Transaction Fee Mechanisms
A new impossibility theorem proves no transaction fee mechanism can simultaneously satisfy all prior properties and be resistant to off-chain miner influence.
Restaking Sybil-Proofness: An Impossibility Theorem Limits Slashing Mechanisms
A formal proof establishes that no single slashing mechanism can simultaneously deter both single and multi-identity Sybil attacks, revealing a foundational trade-off in economic security.
