Protocol Execution Tickets Capture MEV and Create a New Native Asset
The Execution Ticket mechanism brokers Maximal Extractable Value directly through a new protocol-native asset, fundamentally solving MEV's centralization risk and creating a more robust economic model.
Set Byzantine Consensus Decentralizes Rollup Sequencing and Data Availability
Set Byzantine Consensus introduces a new primitive for L2s, enabling a decentralized 'arranger' service to eliminate sequencer centralization and censorship risk.
Concurrent DAG Block Production Enables Frontrunning via Finalization Ordering Manipulation
Research exposes how leaderless DAG consensus protocols, designed for throughput, introduce a new, exploitable frontrunning vector during transaction finalization.
FairFlow: Randomized Ordering and Auction Mechanisms Mitigate MEV
The FairFlow Protocol integrates randomized transaction ordering and auction mechanisms to reduce MEV extraction by 60%, fortifying on-chain fairness.
Layer One Sequencing Secures Rollups Decentralization and Censorship Resistance
The Based Rollups paradigm leverages the Layer One's block production to sequence Layer Two transactions, fundamentally eliminating centralized sequencer risk and achieving native censorship resistance.
Concise Commitments and Statistical Testing Enforce Fair Transaction Ordering
New mechanism uses concise commitments and statistical honesty tests to mathematically enforce random transaction selection, mitigating ordering manipulation.
Threshold Cryptography Secures Transaction Ordering and Time-Delayed Privacy
This new threshold timelock primitive ensures transaction privacy until a set time, preventing front-running and enabling trustless, time-aware autonomous agents.
Distributed Threshold Encryption Mitigates MEV for Provably Fair Transaction Ordering
Distributed threshold encryption conceals transaction content from block producers, enforcing fair ordering and eliminating front-running opportunities.
Decentralized Auction and Encryption Mitigate MEV, Ensuring Equitable Transaction Ordering
FairFlow introduces a commit-reveal auction and randomized ordering to eliminate validator control over transaction sequencing, potentially restoring fairness to DeFi.
Cryptographic Randomness and Privacy Mitigate MEV Exploitation
Zero-knowledge proofs and verifiable randomness secure fair transaction ordering, eliminating front-running and democratizing extractable value.
Deterministic Fee Mechanisms Cannot Be Collusion-Resistant and Incentive-Compatible
No deterministic transaction fee mechanism can be simultaneously user-incentive compatible, miner-incentive compatible, and collusion-resistant without being trivial.
Cryptographic Auctions and Miner Reserves Achieve Off-Chain Influence Proofness
A new cryptographic auction model with miner-set reserves establishes 'Off-Chain Influence Proofness,' mitigating hidden MEV and redefining transaction fee mechanism design.
Application-Layer Mechanism Eliminates Arbitrage and MEV in Decentralized Finance
A novel AMM mechanism processes transactions in batches using a constant potential function, guaranteeing arbitrage resilience and user incentive compatibility.
Fino Protocol Achieves MEV Protection on High-Throughput DAG Consensus
Fino embeds blind order-fairness into DAG-BFT with zero message overhead, securing high-throughput systems against transaction reordering attacks.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Guarantees Strategy Proofness for AMMs
By shifting MEV mitigation from consensus to smart contract design, a new mechanism guarantees strategy proofness and arbitrage resilience for automated market makers.
Cryptography Circumvents TFM Impossibility for Fair Decentralized Systems
Game theory proves a fundamental impossibility in transaction fee mechanisms, which is solved by cryptographic primitives that enforce fair ordering and privacy.
Active Block Producers Preclude Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
An impossibility proof shows no single TFM can align incentives for both users and active MEV-extracting block producers, mandating external design augmentation.
Time-Bound Signatures Restore EIP-1559 Equilibrium and Mitigate MEV Extraction
A modified Schnorr signature scheme expiring at a specific block height forces block producers to include transactions, curbing harmful MEV and stabilizing fee markets.
New Mechanism Design Property Secures Transaction Fee Auctions
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' property challenges EIP-1559's security, proving a cryptographic second-price auction is required for true incentive-compatibility.
Asynchronous Atomic Broadcast Ensures Optimal Fair Transaction Ordering
The new AOAB protocol uses absolute timestamps in an asynchronous setting to achieve communication-optimal, MEV-resistant transaction finality.
Three-Slot Finality Protocol Overcomes Consensus Latency and MEV Vulnerability
By integrating a partially synchronous finality gadget with dynamically available consensus, this protocol achieves transaction finality in three slots, fundamentally securing the chain against reorganization risks.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates AMM MEV for Provably Fair DeFi
A new batch-processing AMM mechanism achieves arbitrage resilience and incentive compatibility, fundamentally shifting MEV mitigation to the smart contract layer.
SAKA Mechanism Solves Incentive-Compatibility for Transaction Fee Design
The SAKA mechanism explicitly integrates MEV searchers into transaction fee design, circumventing impossibility results to ensure full incentive-compatibility.
