Asymmetric Verification Secures Fair Transaction Ordering with Succinct Proofs
Asymmetric verification decouples expensive fair ordering computation from efficient verification, mitigating MEV and enabling scalable BFT consensus.
Commitment-Decay Mechanism Secures Decentralized Private Transaction Ordering Fairness
A Commitment-Decay Mechanism uses economic bonds and parameter commitments to provably secure fair transaction ordering in decentralized private pools.
Systematic Framework Optimizes Byzantine Fair Transaction Ordering and MEV Mitigation
A new systematic design guideline formalizes requirements for fair message ordering in Byzantine systems, enabling a critical latency optimization for FIFO protocols.
Threshold Encryption Secures Transaction Ordering Fairness and Mitigates Extractable Value
Threshold encryption decouples transaction submission from execution, forcing validator collusion to extract MEV, thereby enforcing order fairness.
Epochless Batched Threshold Encryption Secures Practical Private Transaction Ordering
BEAT-MEV introduces a novel, epochless Batched Threshold Encryption scheme, eliminating costly MPC setup to enable practical, front-running-resistant private mempools.
Transaction Encryption and Ordering Randomization Mitigate Extractable Value
A new mechanism design model integrates transaction encryption and execution randomization to eliminate block producer control, ensuring provably fair transaction ordering and system integrity.
Decentralized Commit-Reveal Protocol Eliminates MEV Transaction Ordering Exploits
A new commit-reveal scheme forces block producers to order transactions sight unseen, fundamentally eliminating information-based MEV.
Differential Privacy Guarantees Fair Transaction Ordering in Blockchains
Foundational research proves Differential Privacy mechanisms eliminate algorithmic bias, ensuring equal opportunity for all transactions in State Machine Replication.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Secures Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Introducing "Off-Chain Influence Proofness," a new desideratum proving that EIP-1559 enables miner censorship threats, which a Cryptographic Second Price Auction can mitigate.
