Application-Layer Mechanism Design Guarantees Strategy Proofness for AMMs
By shifting MEV mitigation from consensus to smart contract design, a new mechanism guarantees strategy proofness and arbitrage resilience for automated market makers.
Cryptography Circumvents TFM Impossibility for Fair Decentralized Systems
Game theory proves a fundamental impossibility in transaction fee mechanisms, which is solved by cryptographic primitives that enforce fair ordering and privacy.
Active Block Producers Preclude Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
An impossibility proof shows no single TFM can align incentives for both users and active MEV-extracting block producers, mandating external design augmentation.
Time-Bound Signatures Restore EIP-1559 Equilibrium and Mitigate MEV Extraction
A modified Schnorr signature scheme expiring at a specific block height forces block producers to include transactions, curbing harmful MEV and stabilizing fee markets.
New Mechanism Design Property Secures Transaction Fee Auctions
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' property challenges EIP-1559's security, proving a cryptographic second-price auction is required for true incentive-compatibility.
Asynchronous Atomic Broadcast Ensures Optimal Fair Transaction Ordering
The new AOAB protocol uses absolute timestamps in an asynchronous setting to achieve communication-optimal, MEV-resistant transaction finality.
Three-Slot Finality Protocol Overcomes Consensus Latency and MEV Vulnerability
By integrating a partially synchronous finality gadget with dynamically available consensus, this protocol achieves transaction finality in three slots, fundamentally securing the chain against reorganization risks.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates AMM MEV for Provably Fair DeFi
A new batch-processing AMM mechanism achieves arbitrage resilience and incentive compatibility, fundamentally shifting MEV mitigation to the smart contract layer.
SAKA Mechanism Solves Incentive-Compatibility for Transaction Fee Design
The SAKA mechanism explicitly integrates MEV searchers into transaction fee design, circumventing impossibility results to ensure full incentive-compatibility.
