MEV Uncertainty Principles Quantify Transaction Ordering Trade-Offs and Limits
New MEV uncertainty principles quantify the fundamental trade-off between transaction reordering freedom and user economic payoff complexity, proving no universal mitigation exists.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Challenges EIP-1559 and Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
This research introduces off-chain influence proofness, demonstrating EIP-1559's vulnerability to censorship threats and proving fundamental limits on TFM design.
Differential Privacy Ensures Transaction Ordering Fairness in Blockchains
Researchers connect Differential Privacy to State Machine Replication, using cryptographic noise to eliminate algorithmic bias and mitigate Maximal Extractable Value.
Threshold Cryptography Introduces Undetectable Collusion Risks in MEV Mitigation
Analyzing threshold encrypted mempools reveals that cryptographic privacy shifts MEV risk to new, undetectable forms of decryptor collusion and information asymmetry
Decentralized Proposer-Builder Separation Resolves Builder Centralization Risk
This mechanism auctions block-building rights, decentralizing the sequencing process and securing transaction ordering against centralized MEV extraction.
Encrypted Transactions and Randomized Ordering Mitigate Maximal Extractable Value
New MEV-resistant protocol combines transaction encryption with execution randomization, fundamentally removing validator control over profitable ordering.
Protected Order Flow Re-Aligns Validator Incentives for MEV-resistant Transaction Integrity
Protected Order Flow (PROF) enforces transaction sequencing via incentive-compatible bundles, mitigating MEV by making fairness profitable.
Mechanism Design Overcomes Impossibility for Fair Transaction Fee Allocation
A new game-theoretic mechanism, SAKA, circumvents a fundamental impossibility result, achieving incentive-compatibility and 50% welfare for transaction ordering.
Decentralized Shared Sequencing Unlocks Cross-Rollup Composability and Mitigates Centralization Risk
Decentralized Shared Sequencing Unlocks Cross-Rollup Composability and Mitigates Centralization Risk
This new layer decouples rollup execution from transaction ordering, using a BFT consensus to ensure fair, decentralized sequencing and atomic cross-chain state transitions.
