Proposer-Builder Separation Shifts Centralization to Block Builders
Mathematical models quantify how Proposer-Builder Separation equalizes validator rewards but concentrates power in a few skilled block builders, creating a Proof-of-MEV paradigm.
Decentralized Clock Network Enforces Fair Transaction Ordering and Mitigates MEV
A Decentralized Clock Network cryptographically timestamps transactions, decoupling fair ordering from consensus to neutralize adversarial MEV.
Application Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates AMM Maximal Extractable Value
This mechanism design breakthrough achieves strategy proofness for AMMs by batch-processing transactions to maintain a constant potential function, mitigating MEV.
Differential Privacy Guarantees Fair Transaction Ordering in Blockchains
Foundational research proves Differential Privacy mechanisms eliminate algorithmic bias, ensuring equal opportunity for all transactions in State Machine Replication.
