Formal Impossibility Limits Blockchain Fee Mechanism Design, Forcing Trade-Offs
New mechanism design research proves an impossibility for fully incentive-compatible transaction fee protocols, establishing a fundamental trade-off.
Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design Eliminates Automated Market Maker MEV
This research introduces a batch-processing AMM mechanism that maintains a constant potential function, provably eliminating miner arbitrage and enforcing strategy-proof trading.
Batch-Processing AMM Design Eliminates MEV and Guarantees Arbitrage Resilience
A novel AMM mechanism processes all block transactions in a single batch, mathematically eliminating block producer arbitrage and mitigating MEV extraction.
Batch-Processing Mechanism Design Eliminates AMM Arbitrage and MEV Opportunities
This application-layer mechanism achieves arbitrage resilience by batching all transactions, fundamentally removing miner extractable value from AMMs.
Cryptographic Auctions and Miner Reserves Achieve Off-Chain Influence Proofness
A new cryptographic auction model with miner-set reserves establishes 'Off-Chain Influence Proofness,' mitigating hidden MEV and redefining transaction fee mechanism design.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Achieves Strategy Proofness for Automated Market Makers
Researchers devised a new AMM mechanism that uses a constant potential function to eliminate MEV, achieving provable strategy proofness at the application layer.
New AMM Mechanism Achieves Arbitrage Resilience and Strategy Proofness
A new AMM mechanism uses a constant potential function to guarantee arbitrage resilience, shifting MEV mitigation to the application layer.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Secures Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Introducing "Off-Chain Influence Proofness," a new desideratum proving that EIP-1559 enables miner censorship threats, which a Cryptographic Second Price Auction can mitigate.
Impossibility of Off-Chain Influence Proofness in Transaction Fee Mechanisms
A new impossibility theorem proves no transaction fee mechanism can simultaneously satisfy all prior properties and be resistant to off-chain miner influence.
Smallest Collusions Define Transaction Fee Mechanism Vulnerability
This research reveals that if a blockchain's transaction fee mechanism can be exploited by a two-party collusion, it is inherently vulnerable to any larger collusive group, simplifying security analysis.
Quantifying Ethereum MEV Transaction Re-Ordering’s Economic Impact
This research quantifies the significant economic costs and market distortions caused by Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) transaction re-ordering on Ethereum, revealing hidden burdens on users and the critical need for systemic reforms.
Absolute Commitments Enable Optimal MEV Extraction on Decentralized Exchanges
A novel attack leveraging absolute commitments allows adversaries to monopolize transaction fees, profoundly diminishing decentralized exchange utility.
Batch Processing Eliminates MEV in Automated Market Makers
This research introduces a novel batch-processing mechanism for Automated Market Makers, fundamentally mitigating Miner Extractable Value and fostering equitable transaction execution.
Formalizing Maximal Extractable Value for Robust Blockchain Security
This research establishes a rigorous theoretical framework for Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), enabling systematic analysis and the development of provably secure blockchain protocols.