Mechanism Design Mitigates Selfish Miner Inefficiencies in Blockchain Order Books
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        A novel adjustable block size mechanism quantifies and reduces social welfare loss from selfish miner behavior in blockchain order books, enhancing market efficiency.
        
        Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Blockchain Fees
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        This research designs a truthful, collusion-proof transaction fee mechanism, ensuring miner revenue and network stability through a novel Bayesian approach.
        
        Generic Proof of Useful Work Framework Secures Blockchain Efficiency
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        This research introduces a generic Proof of Useful Work framework, repurposing computation for real-world problems while rigorously securing blockchain consensus.
        
        Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism, leveraging Bayesian game theory, to ensure miner revenue and user truthfulness, resolving a critical blockchain economic dilemma.
        
        New Desideratum for Transaction Fee Mechanisms Reveals Inherent Design Trade-Offs
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        Introducing "off-chain influence proofness" reveals fundamental trade-offs in blockchain transaction fee mechanism design, critical for equitable value distribution.
