Protocol Immutability Is Foundational for Rational Economic Behavior
Integrating Austrian economics and game theory reveals that protocol mutability elevates time preference, destabilizing cooperative equilibria and incentivizing rent-seeking over rational investment.
Mechanism Design Mitigates Selfish Miner Inefficiencies in Blockchain Order Books
A novel adjustable block size mechanism quantifies and reduces social welfare loss from selfish miner behavior in blockchain order books, enhancing market efficiency.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Blockchain Fees
This research designs a truthful, collusion-proof transaction fee mechanism, ensuring miner revenue and network stability through a novel Bayesian approach.
Generic Proof of Useful Work Framework Secures Blockchain Efficiency
This research introduces a generic Proof of Useful Work framework, repurposing computation for real-world problems while rigorously securing blockchain consensus.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation
This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism, leveraging Bayesian game theory, to ensure miner revenue and user truthfulness, resolving a critical blockchain economic dilemma.
New Desideratum for Transaction Fee Mechanisms Reveals Inherent Design Trade-Offs
Introducing "off-chain influence proofness" reveals fundamental trade-offs in blockchain transaction fee mechanism design, critical for equitable value distribution.
