A myopic miner refers to a participant in a proof-of-work blockchain network who prioritizes immediate, short-term rewards over the long-term stability and security of the network. Such miners might engage in strategies that maximize their current profit, even if these actions could potentially harm the overall network integrity or lead to future revenue reductions. This behavior can include selfish mining tactics or prioritizing certain transaction types. Their actions can disrupt the fair operation of the consensus mechanism.
Context
The behavior of myopic miners is a recurring subject in discussions about blockchain security and economic incentives, particularly in networks relying on proof-of-work. Research often examines how protocol design can mitigate such behaviors and align miner incentives with the network’s collective welfare. Future news will likely report on adjustments to mining reward structures, changes in transaction fee markets, and the transition to alternative consensus mechanisms that aim to reduce the profitability of short-sighted strategies.
The research defines MMIC and OCA-proofness, new game-theoretic primitives that formally analyze and secure transaction fee mechanisms against collusion.
We use cookies to personalize content and marketing, and to analyze our traffic. This helps us maintain the quality of our free resources. manage your preferences below.
Detailed Cookie Preferences
This helps support our free resources through personalized marketing efforts and promotions.
Analytics cookies help us understand how visitors interact with our website, improving user experience and website performance.
Personalization cookies enable us to customize the content and features of our site based on your interactions, offering a more tailored experience.
