Adjustable Block Size Mechanism Binds Miner Selfishness for Social Welfare
A novel adjustable block size mechanism quantifies and eliminates social welfare loss from selfish miners in decentralized order books, achieving optimal outcomes.
Mechanism Design Secures Leaderless Blockchain Protocols with Shared Fee Incentives
Proposes FPA-EQ, the first TFM for multi-proposer systems, achieving Strongly BPIC to align block producer incentives and maximize welfare.
Game Theory Formalizes MEV Competition and Mechanism Design Provides Mitigation
The foundational game-theoretic model establishes that MEV extraction is a Bertrand competition, requiring mechanism design solutions like commit-reveal to restore system welfare.
First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing Secures Leaderless Blockchain Fee Mechanisms
A new mechanism, FPA-EQ, achieves strongly incentive-compatible transaction fee allocation for multi-proposer consensus, securing welfare.
Dynamic MEV Rate Stabilizes Extractor and User Incentives
A novel EIP-1559-style mechanism dynamically regulates Maximal Extractable Value, balancing block producer compensation with overall network welfare.
Novel Auxiliary Mechanism Design Achieves Truthfulness, Collusion-Proofness, and Non-Zero Miner Revenue
By shifting from dominant to Bayesian incentive compatibility, this new auxiliary mechanism method breaks the zero-revenue barrier for secure transaction fee design.
Formalizing Proof-of-Stake Incentive Compatibility and Forking Attack Risk
Game theory proves the fork-choice rule is only eventually incentive-compatible, exposing a rational forking risk under network synchrony shifts.
Strongly BPIC Mechanism Secures Leaderless DAG Consensus Fee Allocation
A new game-theoretic model and First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing (FPA-EQ) mechanism solves transaction fee alignment in leaderless DAG protocols.
