Leaderless Blockchain Transaction Fee Mechanisms with Strong Incentives
A new mechanism, FPA-EQ, solves incentive alignment for block producers in leaderless blockchains, enabling robust, efficient transaction fee markets.
Incentivizing Federated Edge Learning via Game-Theoretic Blockchain Mechanisms
This research introduces a novel game-theoretic framework to incentivize participation and optimize resource pricing in blockchain-enabled federated edge learning, unlocking efficient decentralized AI.
Incentivizing Federated Edge Learning with Blockchain Mechanism Design
This research introduces a Stackelberg game model and ADMM algorithm to motivate edge servers, enabling optimal resource contribution in decentralized AI training.
New Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchains Optimizes Transaction Fees
This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism for leaderless blockchains, ensuring block producer incentives and enhancing network efficiency.
Game Theory Incentives Mitigate Malicious Blockchain Behavior
A novel graph-game theoretic model enhances blockchain security by designing incentives that enforce cooperative node behavior and deter malicious actions.
VeriLLM Enables Efficient, Secure, and Verifiable Decentralized LLM Inference
This research introduces a hybrid verification protocol for decentralized large language model inference, combining empirical checks with cryptographic guarantees to ensure output correctness with minimal overhead, thereby enabling trustworthy AI at scale.
Mechanism Design Secures Leaderless Protocol Block Producer Incentives
A new extensive-form game model and the FPA-EQ mechanism solve block producer incentive misalignment in leaderless consensus protocols.
Cryptography Circumvents TFM Impossibility for Fair Decentralized Systems
Game theory proves a fundamental impossibility in transaction fee mechanisms, which is solved by cryptographic primitives that enforce fair ordering and privacy.
Game-Theoretic Incentives Guarantee Provably Uniform Decentralized Randomness
A new Randomness Incentive Game (RIG) establishes a Nash Equilibrium where participants are compelled to submit provably uniform inputs, securing all decentralized randomness protocols.
