Cryptographic Second Price Auction Resolves Decentralized Transaction Ordering Impossibility
The Cryptographic Second Price Auction uses encrypted bids to eliminate the miner's informational advantage, achieving a truly incentive-compatible, collusion-proof transaction ordering mechanism.
Cryptographic Second-Price Auction Enforces Transaction Fairness Eliminating Miner Influence
The Cryptographic Second-Price Auction (C2PA) uses encrypted bids to decouple transaction value from block production, ensuring credible neutrality and mitigating MEV.
Cryptographic Auction Enforces Off-Chain Influence Proofness for Fee Mechanisms
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' criterion exposes EIP-1559's vulnerability, necessitating a cryptographic second-price auction with on-chain miner reserves.
Cryptographic Second-Price Auction Achieves Off-Chain Influence-Proof Transaction Fee Mechanism
The Cryptographic Second-Price Auction (C2PA) overcomes TFM impossibility by encrypting user bids, eliminating miner off-chain influence and achieving strategic simplicity.
Cryptographic Auctions and Miner Reserves Achieve Off-Chain Influence Proofness
A new cryptographic auction model with miner-set reserves establishes 'Off-Chain Influence Proofness,' mitigating hidden MEV and redefining transaction fee mechanism design.
New Mechanism Design Property Secures Transaction Fee Auctions
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' property challenges EIP-1559's security, proving a cryptographic second-price auction is required for true incentive-compatibility.
Cryptographic Auctions Secure Transaction Fees against Off-Chain Influence
A new cryptographic second-price auction enforces off-chain influence proofness, fundamentally securing transaction fee mechanisms against miner censorship and rent-seeking.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Establishes New Fair Transaction Mechanism Desideratum
A new economic primitive, Off-Chain Influence Proofness, reveals EIP-1559's vulnerability to miner censorship, mandating cryptographic auction adoption.
Impossibility of Off-Chain Influence Proofness in Transaction Fee Mechanisms
A new impossibility theorem proves no transaction fee mechanism can simultaneously satisfy all prior properties and be resistant to off-chain miner influence.
