Time-Averaged Commitment Smooths MEV Auctions, Decentralizing Transaction Ordering
Introducing the Smooth-Running Auction, a mechanism using Time-Averaged Commitments to decouple block value from proposer revenue, stabilizing MEV and promoting decentralization.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates MEV Guaranteeing Provable Strategy Proofness
Research shifts MEV mitigation from consensus to smart contracts, using batch processing and a potential function to ensure arbitrage resilience and fairer DeFi markets.
Formalizing MEV with Adversarial Knowledge Enables Provable Security
This abstract model defines Maximal Extractable Value via adversarial knowledge, providing the foundational theory for provable security against economic attacks.
Time-Bound Signatures Mitigate MEV by Enforcing Transaction Inclusion Deadlines
A modified Schnorr signature cryptographically ties transaction validity to block height, eliminating rational producer MEV deferral and ensuring fairer ordering.
Threshold Cryptography Enforces Fair Transaction Ordering Mitigating MEV
A distributed threshold cryptosystem decouples transaction ordering from content knowledge, mathematically eliminating frontrunning risk and centralizing MEV incentives.
Decoupling Transaction Ordering from Execution Is the Key to Systemic MEV Mitigation
A new Decoupled Execution and Ordering framework enforces fair sequencing by committing to order before content is visible, neutralizing predatory MEV.
Verifiable Decryption Secures Proposer-Builder Separation against Censorship
A new two-tiered architecture incorporates publicly verifiable decryption, resolving the censorship vulnerability inherent in existing block-building separation models.
Differential Privacy Guarantees Fair Transaction Ordering in Blockchains
Foundational research proves Differential Privacy mechanisms eliminate algorithmic bias, ensuring equal opportunity for all transactions in State Machine Replication.
Differential Privacy Ensures Transaction Ordering Fairness in State Replication
By mapping the "equal opportunity" fairness problem to Differential Privacy, this research unlocks a new class of provably fair, bias-resistant transaction ordering mechanisms.
