Verifiable Delay Functions Secure Consensus Randomness with Provable Delay
VDFs are sequential cryptographic timekeepers that make randomness manipulation computationally prohibitive, enhancing Proof-of-Stake security and finality.
Batch-Processing AMM Design Eliminates MEV and Guarantees Arbitrage Resilience
A novel AMM mechanism processes all block transactions in a single batch, mathematically eliminating block producer arbitrage and mitigating MEV extraction.
Distributed Threshold Encryption Mitigates MEV for Provably Fair Transaction Ordering
Distributed threshold encryption conceals transaction content from block producers, enforcing fair ordering and eliminating front-running opportunities.
Decentralized Auction and Encryption Mitigate MEV, Ensuring Equitable Transaction Ordering
FairFlow introduces a commit-reveal auction and randomized ordering to eliminate validator control over transaction sequencing, potentially restoring fairness to DeFi.
Cryptographic Randomness and Privacy Mitigate MEV Exploitation
Zero-knowledge proofs and verifiable randomness secure fair transaction ordering, eliminating front-running and democratizing extractable value.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Secures Arbitrage-Resilient Decentralized Finance
By shifting MEV mitigation to the AMM's core logic, this mechanism guarantees risk-free profit elimination and truthful user behavior under fair sequencing.
New AMM Mechanism Achieves Arbitrage Resilience and Strategy Proofness
A new AMM mechanism uses a constant potential function to guarantee arbitrage resilience, shifting MEV mitigation to the application layer.
Tournament Algorithm Establishes Fair Leader Election for Decentralized Consensus
PureLottery introduces a single-elimination tournament model, leveraging VDFs to achieve provably fair, bias-resistant leader election critical for PoS security.
Multi-Party Computation Enables Fairer Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Cryptography, via Multi-Party Computation among block producers, circumvents game-theoretic impossibility results to design non-trivial, incentive-compatible fee mechanisms.
