Transaction Encryption and Ordering Randomization Mitigate Extractable Value
A new mechanism design model integrates transaction encryption and execution randomization to eliminate block producer control, ensuring provably fair transaction ordering and system integrity.
Threshold Encryption Secures Transaction Ordering Fairness and Mitigates Extractable Value
Threshold encryption decouples transaction submission from execution, forcing validator collusion to extract MEV, thereby enforcing order fairness.
Systematic Framework Optimizes Byzantine Fair Transaction Ordering and MEV Mitigation
A new systematic design guideline formalizes requirements for fair message ordering in Byzantine systems, enabling a critical latency optimization for FIFO protocols.
Asymmetric Verification Secures Fair Transaction Ordering with Succinct Proofs
Asymmetric verification decouples expensive fair ordering computation from efficient verification, mitigating MEV and enabling scalable BFT consensus.
Decentralized Clock Network Enforces Fair Transaction Ordering Using Timestamps
This work introduces a Decentralized Clock Network that separates transaction ordering from consensus, using timestamp agreement to enforce $delta$-Median Fairness and mitigate front-running.
Decoupling Fair Ordering from Consensus Unlocks High-Performance BFT
SpeedyFair decouples transaction ordering from consensus, using parallel processing to achieve a $1.5times-2.45times$ throughput increase over state-of-the-art fair ordering protocols.
DAG Consensus Achieves Blind Order-Fairness Mitigating MEV
Integrating a commit-and-reveal framework with DAG-based Byzantine Fault Tolerance establishes Blind Order-Fairness, securing transaction sequencing from malicious extraction.
Fair Consensus Factory Mitigates MEV through Order Neutrality
Research introduces the Fair Consensus Factory, a systemic framework to integrate order-fairness primitives into Byzantine consensus, directly addressing the foundational MEV problem.
Mechanism Design for Fair Decentralized Transaction Ordering Using Private Information
A multi-dimensional contract-theoretic mechanism uses weighted sorting on user-disclosed private preferences to fundamentally eliminate frontrunning MEV.
