Proposer-builder separation (PBS) is an architectural design in blockchain networks, particularly in proof-of-stake systems, that decouples the roles of block proposers and block builders. In this model, specialized builders create blocks by selecting and ordering transactions based on economic incentives, and then proposers select the most profitable block to present to the network. This separation aims to enhance decentralization, censorship resistance, and economic efficiency. Understanding PBS is important for comprehending the evolving mechanisms of transaction ordering and block production in advanced blockchain architectures.
Context
Proposer-builder separation is a key area of research and development for scaling and decentralizing blockchain networks, particularly those employing proof-of-stake consensus. Discussions are active regarding its implementation on major networks, with debates focusing on its potential impact on validator centralization, MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) dynamics, and overall network security. Future developments will likely involve practical implementations and ongoing refinement of the economic incentives governing builders and proposers.
A new class of Conditional Resource Exhaustion Attacks is formalized, exploiting Turing-complete execution to decouple validator work from fee compensation, fundamentally compromising blockchain liveness.
An economic model reveals that Proposer-Builder Separation, using Execution Tickets, concentrates MEV extraction among high-capital buyers, fundamentally challenging decentralization.
PROF introduces a mechanism to minimize adversarial MEV in Proposer-Builder Separation, transcending the tradeoff between user protection and transaction inclusion rate.
PANDAS uses direct communication and a two-phase seeding/consolidation model to meet the 4-second DAS deadline, ensuring data availability despite malicious nodes.
A new axiomatic framework formalizes Maximal Extractable Value using an abstract blockchain model, enabling provable security guarantees for mechanism design.
A new two-tiered architecture incorporates publicly verifiable decryption, resolving the censorship vulnerability inherent in existing block-building separation models.
PANDAS, a novel two-phase network protocol, leverages direct communication and PBS to meet the stringent 4-second deadline for large-scale data availability sampling.
Introducing the Smooth-Running Auction, a mechanism using Time-Averaged Commitments to decouple block value from proposer revenue, stabilizing MEV and promoting decentralization.
This research quantifies the significant economic costs and market distortions caused by Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) transaction re-ordering on Ethereum, revealing hidden burdens on users and the critical need for systemic reforms.
This research establishes a rigorous, abstract model for Maximal Extractable Value, enabling formal security proofs for blockchain protocols and smart contracts.
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