L1 Proposers Decouple Rollup Sequencing for Maximum Decentralization
The Based Sequencing model shifts rollup transaction ordering to the L1 validator set, fundamentally inheriting L1 security and eliminating sequencer centralization risk.
Commitment Proofs Decentralize Block Production and Ensure Transaction Inclusion
A Commitment-Inclusion Proof mechanism decouples transaction inclusion from ordering, eliminating builder censorship risk for a fairer block production architecture.
Protected Order Flow Minimizes MEV While Preserving Proposer-Builder Separation
Protected Order Flow (PROF) is a new mechanism limiting adversarial MEV extraction in PBS without sacrificing transaction speed or validator profit.
Game-Theoretic Model Quantifies MEV-Boost Auction Inefficiency and Strategic Latency Dominance
A game-theoretic model formalizes MEV-Boost auctions, demonstrating how latency and strategic bidding, not maximal value, drive block selection, quantifying auction inefficiency.
Decentralized Proposer-Builder Separation Resolves Builder Centralization Risk
This mechanism auctions block-building rights, decentralizing the sequencing process and securing transaction ordering against centralized MEV extraction.
Protected Order Flow Re-Aligns Validator Incentives for MEV-resistant Transaction Integrity
Protected Order Flow (PROF) enforces transaction sequencing via incentive-compatible bundles, mitigating MEV by making fairness profitable.
Proposer-Builder Separation Centralizes Block Production and Stimulates Censorship
Proposer-Builder Separation democratizes MEV revenue but empirically shifts centralization risk to opaque builders and relays, demanding in-protocol solutions.
Cryptographic Second-Price Auction Enforces Transaction Fairness Eliminating Miner Influence
The Cryptographic Second-Price Auction (C2PA) uses encrypted bids to decouple transaction value from block production, ensuring credible neutrality and mitigating MEV.
Sealed-Bid Auction Formalizes Credible Neutrality, Preventing Proposer-Builder Collusion
The Sealed-Bid Commit-Reveal Auction cryptographically decouples proposer selection from payload content, establishing a new fairness primitive for decentralized transaction ordering.
