TRAIL: Cross-Shard Validation for Byzantine Shard Protection
TRAIL introduces a dynamic cross-shard validation algorithm, leveraging asset history to select validators, enhancing scalability and resilience against malicious shards.
Intuitive Voting Strategies Ensure Robust, Efficient Committee-Based Blockchain Consensus
This research reveals that simple, intuitive voting in committee-based consensus protocols converges exponentially to optimal outcomes, enhancing blockchain scalability and security.
Formal Verification Secures Zero-Knowledge Proof Circuits from Exploitable Flaws
Novel static analysis and verification tools precisely identify and prevent critical vulnerabilities within zero-knowledge proof circuits, fortifying decentralized systems.
Incentivizing Censorship Resistance in Multi-Proposer Blockchain Fee Mechanisms
This research designs transaction fee mechanisms to robustly prevent censorship and bribery in multi-proposer blockchain protocols, enhancing network integrity.
Wakeness Vectors Secure Proof-of-Stake against Fully-Fluctuating Node Participation
Wakeness vectors enable Proof-of-Stake protocols to securely handle arbitrary node participation fluctuations, rivaling Proof-of-Work robustness.
Mechanism Design Enforces Truthful Consensus, Mitigating Disputes in Proof-of-Stake
Applying economic revelation mechanisms to PoS protocols ensures truthful block proposal as the unique equilibrium, fundamentally enhancing network robustness.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus in Proof-of-Stake Networks
Mechanism design introduces revelation games to Proof-of-Stake, ensuring a unique truthful equilibrium that fundamentally mitigates coordination failures and dishonest forks.
Accountable Delegation Secures Proof-of-Stake Liveness and Safety
A new Verifiable Inactivity Proof primitive enforces real-time delegate accountability, fundamentally securing DPoS liveness against non-participation.
Formalizing Proof-of-Stake Incentive Compatibility and Forking Attack Risk
Game theory proves the fork-choice rule is only eventually incentive-compatible, exposing a rational forking risk under network synchrony shifts.
