Decentralized Verifiable Computation Mechanisms Limit Efficiency and Participation
Mechanism design for verifiable computation is constrained by a theoretical limit on decentralization, forcing a strategic trade-off between speed and participation.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus in Proof-of-Stake Protocols
Game theory-based revelation mechanisms create a unique, truthful equilibrium for PoS consensus, fundamentally securing block proposal against economic attack.
Mechanism Design Balances Decentralization and Efficiency in Verifiable Computation
New game-theoretic mechanisms characterize the decentralization-efficiency trade-off, enabling provably optimal design for verifiable computation markets.
Mechanism Design Establishes Truthful Equilibrium in Blockchain Consensus
Applying game theory's revelation mechanisms directly to consensus disputes creates a unique, subgame perfect equilibrium that structurally compels truthful block validation.
Mechanism Design for Truthful Blockchain Consensus and Fork Resolution
This research introduces revelation mechanisms, notably Simultaneous Report and Solomonic, to enforce truthful block proposals and resolve forks, enhancing blockchain security and efficiency.
Mechanism Design Enhances Blockchain Consensus Truthfulness and Scalability
This research introduces novel mechanism design principles to fortify blockchain consensus, ensuring truthful block proposals and mitigating fork-related coordination failures.
