Compiler Security Proof Unifies Formal Methods for Distributed Cryptography
This compiler security proof unifies formal methods to synthesize complex, secure distributed cryptographic protocols from simple sequential code, dramatically reducing implementation errors.
Formal Synthesis Proves Secure Distributed Cryptographic Applications
A new compiler security proof automatically translates simple programs into robust, distributed cryptographic systems, shifting security burden to formal verification.
Formal Compiler Proof Secures Distributed Cryptographic Applications Synthesis
A new compiler security proof unifies four formalisms to automatically synthesize complex, secure distributed protocols from simple sequential programs, guaranteeing end-to-end security.
Compiler Proves Security for Distributed Cryptography via Foundational Unification
A formal compiler proof automatically synthesizes secure, distributed cryptographic protocols from simple centralized code, enabling robust, private systems.
Compiler Security Proof Enables Robust Distributed Cryptographic Synthesis
A novel compiler security proof unifies four theoretical models to automatically generate robust, distributed cryptographic systems from simple centralized code, fundamentally simplifying secure application development.
New Zero-Knowledge Model Circumvents Impossibility for Perfect Soundness
By introducing a security definition based on logical independence, this breakthrough achieves non-interactive, transparent zero-knowledge proofs with perfect soundness, eliminating the need for trusted setups.
Formally Synthesizing Secure Distributed Systems from Centralized Programs
This research unifies simulation-based security with compiler techniques to automatically generate provably secure distributed cryptographic applications.
