Formalizing Permissionless Consensus Economic Security with Attack Cost Metrics
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        This research introduces a novel economic security framework, the EAAC property, to rigorously quantify attack costs in permissionless blockchains, ensuring protocol resilience.
        
        Formalizing Slashing to Mitigate Byzantine Exploits in Proof-of-Stake
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        This research reveals critical vulnerabilities in existing Proof-of-Stake penalty mechanisms, proposing a formal framework to design provably robust slashing conditions.
        
        Economic Security Limits in Permissionless Consensus Protocols
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        This research establishes a foundational mathematical framework to rigorously assess the economic security of permissionless blockchain consensus, enabling the design of more resilient protocols.
