Improved Batched Threshold Encryption Secures Private Transaction Ordering
This cryptographic upgrade to Batched Threshold Encryption enables scalable, private mempools, fundamentally eliminating front-running MEV.
Mechanism Design Eliminates MEV by Defining Strategy Proof Automated Market Makers
A novel AMM mechanism enforces a constant potential function across transaction batches, provably eliminating MEV at the application layer.
Mechanism Design Ensures AMM Arbitrage Resilience and User Incentive Compatibility
A new AMM mechanism design achieves provable arbitrage resilience and strategy-proofness by enforcing a constant potential function.
Zero-Knowledge Commitment Enables Private Verifiable Mechanism Design
Cryptography now allows a mechanism designer to prove a system's fairness and incentive compatibility without revealing its private economic rules, securing hidden yet verifiable contracts.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates MEV and Ensures Strategy Proofness
A new AMM mechanism design achieves provable arbitrage resilience and strategy proofness, shifting MEV mitigation from consensus to the application layer.
Batch Mechanism Design Achieves Provable MEV Resilience for Automated Market Makers
This novel batch-clearing AMM mechanism provides provable arbitrage resilience, shifting MEV mitigation from consensus to the application layer.
Application Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates AMM Maximal Extractable Value
This mechanism design breakthrough achieves strategy proofness for AMMs by batch-processing transactions to maintain a constant potential function, mitigating MEV.
Batch Processing AMM Achieves Arbitrage Resilience and Strategy Proofness
This new batch-clearing AMM mechanism formally eliminates miner extractable value by settling all trades at a single price, ensuring strategy-proof execution.
First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing Secures Leaderless Blockchain Fee Mechanisms
A new mechanism, FPA-EQ, achieves strongly incentive-compatible transaction fee allocation for multi-proposer consensus, securing welfare.
Formal AMM Mechanism Achieves Strategy-Proofness and Eliminates Miner Arbitrage Profit
A new AMM design uses a constant potential function to process batched transactions, formally eliminating miner arbitrage and ensuring application-layer strategy-proofness.
Mechanism Design Eliminates AMM MEV Opportunities
A novel batch-processing AMM mechanism achieves arbitrage resilience for block producers and guarantees incentive compatibility in fair-sequencing models.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Strategy-Proof Consensus in Proof-of-Stake
A novel mechanism design uses staked assets to cryptoeconomically guarantee validator honesty, solving the foundational problem of fork coordination and untruthful block proposals.
Mechanism Design Achieves Strategy-Proof AMMs Eliminating MEV at the Application Layer
A new batch-processing AMM mechanism uses a constant potential function to ensure arbitrage resilience and strategy-proofness, fundamentally mitigating MEV.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Achieves Strategy-Proof Automated Market Makers
A new AMM design uses a constant potential function to batch transactions, proving arbitrage resilience and strategy proofness against MEV.
Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanism Achieves Optimal Miner Revenue and Strategy-Proofness
A new Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanism leverages a soft second-price auction to achieve optimal miner revenue while preserving strategy-proofness.
AMM Mechanism Achieves Strategy Proofness through Constant Potential Function
Designing Automated Market Makers with a constant potential function provably eliminates miner arbitrage, fundamentally securing on-chain trading.
Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design Eliminates Automated Market Maker MEV
This research introduces a batch-processing AMM mechanism that maintains a constant potential function, provably eliminating miner arbitrage and enforcing strategy-proof trading.
Batch-Processing AMM Design Eliminates MEV and Guarantees Arbitrage Resilience
A novel AMM mechanism processes all block transactions in a single batch, mathematically eliminating block producer arbitrage and mitigating MEV extraction.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Achieves Strategy Proofness for Automated Market Makers
Researchers devised a new AMM mechanism that uses a constant potential function to eliminate MEV, achieving provable strategy proofness at the application layer.
Mechanism Design Guarantees Truthful Consensus in Decentralized Systems
Game theory's revelation mechanisms enforce honest block proposal by establishing a unique, subgame perfect equilibrium in Proof-of-Stake protocols.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Guarantees Strategy Proofness for AMMs
By shifting MEV mitigation from consensus to smart contract design, a new mechanism guarantees strategy proofness and arbitrage resilience for automated market makers.
New AMM Mechanism Achieves Arbitrage Resilience and Strategy Proofness
A new AMM mechanism uses a constant potential function to guarantee arbitrage resilience, shifting MEV mitigation to the application layer.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates AMM MEV for Provably Fair DeFi
A new batch-processing AMM mechanism achieves arbitrage resilience and incentive compatibility, fundamentally shifting MEV mitigation to the smart contract layer.
Formalizing MEV with Adversarial Knowledge Enables Provable Security
This abstract model defines Maximal Extractable Value via adversarial knowledge, providing the foundational theory for provable security against economic attacks.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Achieves Provable MEV Incentive Compatibility
A new AMM mechanism ensures provable incentive compatibility by maintaining a constant potential function, fundamentally eliminating application-layer MEV exploitation.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates MEV Guaranteeing Provable Strategy Proofness
Research shifts MEV mitigation from consensus to smart contracts, using batch processing and a potential function to ensure arbitrage resilience and fairer DeFi markets.
