Mechanism Design Overcomes Impossibility for Incentive-Compatible MEV Mitigation
Foundational impossibility theorem on transaction fee mechanisms is circumvented by SAKA, a new design securing 50% welfare and full incentive compatibility.
Mechanism Design Overcomes Impossibility for Fair Transaction Fee Allocation
A new game-theoretic mechanism, SAKA, circumvents a fundamental impossibility result, achieving incentive-compatibility and 50% welfare for transaction ordering.
RediSwap Mechanism Captures MEV and LVR, Redistributing Value to Users and LPs
This mechanism design breakthrough internalizes arbitrage within AMMs, capturing MEV to provide superior execution and fair value distribution.
SAKA Mechanism Solves Incentive-Compatibility for Transaction Fee Design
The SAKA mechanism explicitly integrates MEV searchers into transaction fee design, circumventing impossibility results to ensure full incentive-compatibility.
