Game Theory Secures Oracle Data Quality and Node Incentives
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        A Stackelberg game model resolves the oracle problem's incentive conflict, creating an equilibrium for secure, high-quality decentralized price feeds.
        
        Formally Verifying Threat Models and Detection Logic Conformance
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        A new formal verification framework bridges abstract threat models and concrete detection rules, enhancing system security through automated conformance checking.
        
        Formal Verification Framework for Secure Tokenized Financial Contracts
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        A new framework combines ACTUS and the B-Method to mathematically prove financial smart contract correctness, ensuring secure-by-design tokenized finance.
        
        Adaptive Byzantine Agreement Protocol Enhances Distributed System Resilience
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        A novel randomized Byzantine agreement protocol significantly improves round complexity against adaptive adversaries, bolstering the security and efficiency of distributed systems.
        
        Intuitive Voting Strategies Ensure Robust, Efficient Committee-Based Blockchain Consensus
        
        
        
        
          
        
        
      
        
    
        
        This research reveals that simple, intuitive voting in committee-based consensus protocols converges exponentially to optimal outcomes, enhancing blockchain scalability and security.
