Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus in Proof-of-Stake Protocols
Game theory-based revelation mechanisms create a unique, truthful equilibrium for PoS consensus, fundamentally securing block proposal against economic attack.
Epidemic Consensus Protocol Unlocks Extreme-Scale Decentralization
A new consensus protocol leveraging epidemic-style communication eliminates fixed validators, achieving superior throughput and latency for extreme-scale networks.
Formalizing MEV Theory for Provably Secure Blockchain Architectures
This research establishes a foundational mathematical framework for Maximal Extractable Value, enabling rigorous analysis and provably secure defenses against economic exploitation.
Formalizing MEV: Rigorous Model for Provably Secure Blockchain Architectures
This research introduces a formal, abstract model for Maximal Extractable Value, enabling systematic analysis and the development of provably secure blockchain protocols.
Mechanism Design Enhances Blockchain Consensus Truthfulness and Scalability
This research introduces novel mechanism design principles to fortify blockchain consensus, ensuring truthful block proposals and mitigating fork-related coordination failures.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Enable Private, Verifiable Mechanism Design
This research introduces a framework for privately committing to and executing economic mechanisms, leveraging zero-knowledge proofs to ensure verifiability without revealing sensitive rules or data, fostering trustless interactions.
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms: Commitment without Disclosure
A novel framework leverages zero-knowledge proofs to enable verifiable, private execution of economic mechanisms without revealing their underlying rules or requiring trusted intermediaries.
Formalizing MEV Theory for Provable Blockchain Security
A new formal theory for Maximal Extractable Value offers a robust framework to understand and secure blockchain systems against economic attacks.
Formalizing Maximal Extractable Value for Provable Blockchain Security
This research establishes a rigorous, abstract model of MEV to enable formal security proofs against economic attacks in decentralized systems.
Batch Processing Eliminates MEV in Automated Market Makers
This research introduces a novel batch-processing mechanism for Automated Market Makers, fundamentally mitigating Miner Extractable Value and fostering equitable transaction execution.
Formalizing Maximal Extractable Value for Robust Blockchain Security
This research establishes a rigorous theoretical framework for Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), enabling systematic analysis and the development of provably secure blockchain protocols.
Formalizing Maximal Extractable Value for Blockchain Security
This research establishes a formal theory for Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), providing a foundational framework to analyze and mitigate economic attacks on public blockchains.
Formalizing MEV: A Foundational Theory for Blockchain Security
Researchers introduce a formal theory of Maximal Extractable Value, providing a rigorous framework to understand and counter economic attacks in decentralized systems.
MEV Mitigation via Game Theory and Mechanism Design
This research formally models Maximal Extractable Value dynamics, proving its systemic welfare costs, and proposes cryptographic mechanisms to mitigate its adverse effects on decentralized finance.
Formalizing MEV: Foundations for Secure Blockchain Mechanism Design
This research formalizes Maximal Extractable Value, providing a rigorous framework for understanding and mitigating systemic blockchain vulnerabilities.
Formalizing Maximal Extractable Value for Blockchain Security Proofs
This research establishes a formal theory of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) through an abstract blockchain model, enabling rigorous security proofs against economic attacks.
