Formalizing MEV as a Game to Quantify Mitigation Strategies
Game theory formalizes the MEV supply chain, proving unconstrained transaction ordering creates a systemic welfare loss, unlocking quantified mitigation via mechanism design.
Threshold Cryptography Introduces Undetectable Collusion Risks in MEV Mitigation
Analyzing threshold encrypted mempools reveals that cryptographic privacy shifts MEV risk to new, undetectable forms of decryptor collusion and information asymmetry
Game Theory Formalizes MEV Competition and Mechanism Design Provides Mitigation
The foundational game-theoretic model establishes that MEV extraction is a Bertrand competition, requiring mechanism design solutions like commit-reveal to restore system welfare.
One-Time Batched Threshold Decryption Achieves Practical, Scalable Mempool Privacy
This new batched threshold decryption primitive enables practical MEV mitigation by securing transactions with a one-time cryptographic setup and constant-size partial decryptions.
Proof-of-Encryption Cryptographically Eliminates MEV at the Consensus Layer
The new Proof-of-Encryption consensus, powered by Threshold Encryption, cryptographically eliminates MEV by keeping transactions private until finality.
Distributed Threshold Encryption Mitigates MEV for Provably Fair Transaction Ordering
Distributed threshold encryption conceals transaction content from block producers, enforcing fair ordering and eliminating front-running opportunities.
Threshold Encryption Eliminates MEV at Consensus Layer
Blockchain Integrated Threshold Encryption cryptographically conceals transaction data until finality, making front-running impossible and securing decentralized finance.
Cryptographic Accountability Breaks Privacy Deadlock for Decentralized Systems
This novel system employs zero-knowledge and threshold cryptography to enable transaction privacy with a governance-gated, auditable de-anonymization mechanism.
Cryptography Circumvents TFM Impossibility for Fair Decentralized Systems
Game theory proves a fundamental impossibility in transaction fee mechanisms, which is solved by cryptographic primitives that enforce fair ordering and privacy.
