Cryptographic Second Price Auctions Secure Transaction Ordering and Mitigate Adversarial MEV
Encrypting transaction bids via a Cryptographic Second Price Auction formally decouples miner revenue from user incentives, ensuring provably fair block construction.
Characterizing Off-Chain Influence-Proof Fee Mechanisms via a Burn Identity
Foundational mechanism design proves that off-chain influence-proof transaction fees are mathematically equivalent to a novel burn identity, securing transaction ordering.
On-Chain Randomness Enables Fair Transaction Inclusion without Miner Manipulation
Introducing rTFM, a mechanism using on-chain randomness to decouple miner incentives from fair transaction inclusion, unlocking equitable blockspace access.
Mechanism Design Secures Leaderless Blockchain Protocols with Shared Fee Incentives
Proposes FPA-EQ, the first TFM for multi-proposer systems, achieving Strongly BPIC to align block producer incentives and maximize welfare.
SAKA Mechanism Solves Incentive-Compatibility for Active Block Producers
Introducing the SAKA mechanism, this work circumvents TFM impossibility results by integrating MEV searchers to align incentives and guarantee approximate welfare.
Mechanism Design Decentralizes ZK Proving, Ensuring Rollup Liveness and Economic Sustainability
A new transaction fee mechanism for ZK-Rollup prover markets is proposed, transforming centralized proof generation into a competitive, decentralized commodity.
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Overcomes MEV Impossibility with Searcher Augmentation
The SAKA mechanism resolves the TFM impossibility theorem for active block producers by integrating MEV searchers to ensure incentive compatibility and welfare.
Mechanism Design Overcomes Impossibility for Incentive-Compatible MEV Mitigation
Foundational impossibility theorem on transaction fee mechanisms is circumvented by SAKA, a new design securing 50% welfare and full incentive compatibility.
