Uncompensated Work Decoupling Enables Speculative Blockchain Denial-of-Service
A new class of Conditional Resource Exhaustion Attacks is formalized, exploiting Turing-complete execution to decouple validator work from fee compensation, fundamentally compromising blockchain liveness.
Execution Tickets Centralize MEV Extraction through Capital Advantage
An economic model reveals that Proposer-Builder Separation, using Execution Tickets, concentrates MEV extraction among high-capital buyers, fundamentally challenging decentralization.
Deterministic Fee Mechanisms Cannot Be Collusion-Resistant and Incentive-Compatible
No deterministic transaction fee mechanism can be simultaneously user-incentive compatible, miner-incentive compatible, and collusion-resistant without being trivial.
Cryptographic Auctions and Miner Reserves Achieve Off-Chain Influence Proofness
A new cryptographic auction model with miner-set reserves establishes 'Off-Chain Influence Proofness,' mitigating hidden MEV and redefining transaction fee mechanism design.
Active Block Producers Preclude Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
An impossibility proof shows no single TFM can align incentives for both users and active MEV-extracting block producers, mandating external design augmentation.
Impossibility Proof for Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms
Foundational mechanism design proves no deterministic transaction fee auction can simultaneously ensure user truthfulness, miner revenue, and collusion resistance.
Time-Bound Signatures Restore EIP-1559 Equilibrium and Mitigate MEV Extraction
A modified Schnorr signature scheme expiring at a specific block height forces block producers to include transactions, curbing harmful MEV and stabilizing fee markets.
New Mechanism Design Property Secures Transaction Fee Auctions
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' property challenges EIP-1559's security, proving a cryptographic second-price auction is required for true incentive-compatibility.
Cryptographic Auctions Secure Transaction Fees against Off-Chain Influence
A new cryptographic second-price auction enforces off-chain influence proofness, fundamentally securing transaction fee mechanisms against miner censorship and rent-seeking.
Mechanism Design Secures Leaderless Protocol Block Producer Incentives
A new extensive-form game model and the FPA-EQ mechanism solve block producer incentive misalignment in leaderless consensus protocols.
Leaderless Mechanism Design Secures Transaction Fee Incentive Compatibility
A new mechanism and game-theoretic property ensure that concurrent block producers in leaderless protocols are incentivized to maximize social welfare.
SAKA Mechanism Solves Incentive-Compatibility for Transaction Fee Design
The SAKA mechanism explicitly integrates MEV searchers into transaction fee design, circumventing impossibility results to ensure full incentive-compatibility.
Multi-Party Computation Circumvents Impossibility in Decentralized Mechanism Design for Fair Fees
Cryptographic Multi-Party Computation enables collusion-resistant transaction fee mechanisms, transforming a game-theoretic impossibility into a secure computation problem.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Establishes New Fair Transaction Mechanism Desideratum
A new economic primitive, Off-Chain Influence Proofness, reveals EIP-1559's vulnerability to miner censorship, mandating cryptographic auction adoption.
Decentralized Proving Markets Secure Verifiable Computation Outsourcing Efficiency
This paper introduces a mechanism design framework for a decentralized proving market, transforming zero-knowledge proof generation into a competitive, economically efficient service.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Secures Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Introducing "Off-Chain Influence Proofness," a new desideratum proving that EIP-1559 enables miner censorship threats, which a Cryptographic Second Price Auction can mitigate.
ZK-Rollup Fee Mechanisms Must Price Proving Costs to Prevent Attacks
Unaligned fee mechanisms create prover-killer attacks, fundamentally challenging ZK-Rollup liveness and demanding a cost-aware mechanism design.
Active Block Producers Create Transaction Fee Mechanism Impossibility
Mechanism design proves that maximal extractable value fundamentally prevents simultaneous incentive compatibility and welfare maximization.
SAKA Mechanism Circumvents Transaction Fee Impossibility Theorem
Research establishes a mechanism design impossibility for simple fee structures, then introduces the SAKA mechanism to achieve incentive-compatibility and high welfare by formalizing searcher roles.
Impossibility of Off-Chain Influence Proofness in Transaction Fee Mechanisms
A new impossibility theorem proves no transaction fee mechanism can simultaneously satisfy all prior properties and be resistant to off-chain miner influence.
Reasonable-World Assumption Solves Zero Miner Revenue Impossibility Theorem
A new mechanism design incorporates honest user assumptions to achieve asymptotically optimal miner revenue, resolving a core theoretical conflict.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Yields Truthful, Collusion-Proof Blockchain Transaction Fees
This research introduces an auxiliary mechanism method to design transaction fee mechanisms that overcome existing impossibility results, enabling positive miner revenue while preserving truthfulness and collusion-proof properties in blockchain systems.
Bayesian Mechanism Design Secures Miner Revenue and User Incentives
This research introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism, ensuring miner profitability and user truthfulness by leveraging Bayesian game theory.
