Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanism Achieves Optimal Miner Revenue and Strategy-Proofness
A new Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanism leverages a soft second-price auction to achieve optimal miner revenue while preserving strategy-proofness.
Cryptographic Auction Enforces Off-Chain Influence Proofness for Fee Mechanisms
A new 'off-chain influence proofness' criterion exposes EIP-1559's vulnerability, necessitating a cryptographic second-price auction with on-chain miner reserves.
Formal Impossibility Limits Blockchain Fee Mechanism Design, Forcing Trade-Offs
New mechanism design research proves an impossibility for fully incentive-compatible transaction fee protocols, establishing a fundamental trade-off.
Cryptographic Second-Price Auction Achieves Off-Chain Influence-Proof Transaction Fee Mechanism
The Cryptographic Second-Price Auction (C2PA) overcomes TFM impossibility by encrypting user bids, eliminating miner off-chain influence and achieving strategic simplicity.
Strongly BPIC Mechanism Secures Leaderless DAG Consensus Fee Allocation
A new game-theoretic model and First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing (FPA-EQ) mechanism solves transaction fee alignment in leaderless DAG protocols.
Decoupling Work and Compensation Enables Resource Exhaustion Attacks on Blockchains
New attack vectors exploit Turing-complete transaction logic to decouple validator work from fee compensation, compromising blockchain liveness.
Uncompensated Work Decoupling Enables Speculative Blockchain Denial-of-Service
A new class of Conditional Resource Exhaustion Attacks is formalized, exploiting Turing-complete execution to decouple validator work from fee compensation, fundamentally compromising blockchain liveness.
Execution Tickets Centralize MEV Extraction through Capital Advantage
An economic model reveals that Proposer-Builder Separation, using Execution Tickets, concentrates MEV extraction among high-capital buyers, fundamentally challenging decentralization.
Deterministic Fee Mechanisms Cannot Be Collusion-Resistant and Incentive-Compatible
No deterministic transaction fee mechanism can be simultaneously user-incentive compatible, miner-incentive compatible, and collusion-resistant without being trivial.
