Off-Chain Influence Proofness Challenges EIP-1559 and Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
This research introduces off-chain influence proofness, demonstrating EIP-1559's vulnerability to censorship threats and proving fundamental limits on TFM design.
Mechanism Design Overcomes Impossibility for Fair Transaction Fee Allocation
A new game-theoretic mechanism, SAKA, circumvents a fundamental impossibility result, achieving incentive-compatibility and 50% welfare for transaction ordering.
Application Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates AMM Maximal Extractable Value
This mechanism design breakthrough achieves strategy proofness for AMMs by batch-processing transactions to maintain a constant potential function, mitigating MEV.
Searcher-Auction Mechanism Solves Transaction Fee Incentive Impossibility
Mechanism design incorporating searchers is a theoretical necessity to achieve incentive-compatible transaction fee mechanisms and high social welfare simultaneously.
Cryptographic Second Price Auction Resolves Decentralized Transaction Ordering Impossibility
The Cryptographic Second Price Auction uses encrypted bids to eliminate the miner's informational advantage, achieving a truly incentive-compatible, collusion-proof transaction ordering mechanism.
Cryptographic Second-Price Auction Enforces Transaction Fairness Eliminating Miner Influence
The Cryptographic Second-Price Auction (C2PA) uses encrypted bids to decouple transaction value from block production, ensuring credible neutrality and mitigating MEV.
Dual-Auction Mechanism Decouples ZK-Rollup Proving from Centralization Risk
A two-sided auction mechanism called Prooφ formally decentralizes ZK-Rollup proving, ensuring efficiency and resistance to prover collusion.
Novel Auxiliary Mechanism Design Achieves Truthfulness, Collusion-Proofness, and Non-Zero Miner Revenue
By shifting from dominant to Bayesian incentive compatibility, this new auxiliary mechanism method breaks the zero-revenue barrier for secure transaction fee design.
ZK-Rollup Fee Mechanism Design Space and Cost Optimization
Researchers formalize the ZK-Rollup transaction fee mechanism design space, optimizing operational costs across sequencing, data availability, and proving for long-term incentive compatibility.
